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Abstract
Published twenty years ago, Anthony Howard’s official biography of R. A. 
(Rab) Butler remains the most comprehensive study o f one of the giants of 
twentieth century Conservative politics. Howard portrayed Butler as a liberal 
and progressive politician whose reforming instincts were at times frustrated by 
stronger-willed colleagues, right-wing backbenchers, or Conservative party 
activists. Now widely accepted, this view relies strongly on the liberal reforms 
Butler introduced -  on prisons, betting and licensing -  during his time as Home 
Secretary from January 1957 to July 1962. However, it has also been argued 
that the influence of his junior minister David Renton prevented Butler from 
implementing the Wolfenden Committee’s recommendations on homosexual 
law reform and forced him to introduce restrictions on Commonwealth 
immigration. Moreover, Butler was unable to overcome opposition from 
within the Conservative party to his efforts to abolish capital punishment and 
consistently battled against demands for the re-introduction of judicial 
flogging. It is also possible to discern in the writing on Butler the acceptance 
of a ‘ Jenkinsian’ model that equates the success of a particular Home Secretary 
with the volume and extent of ‘progressive’ or even ‘radical’ legislation that 
they implemented.
A re-evaluation of Rab Butler’s Home Secretaryship is long overdue. 
Examining government files held at the National Archives -  which were 
unavailable at the time Howard was writing -  that shed new light on Butler’s 
character and the motives behind his penal and social policies, this thesis 
challenges several of Howard’s conclusions. Most importantly, what this 
evidence makes clear is that it is vital to adopt a more nuanced view of Butler. 
The argument that certain policies were forced upon him by colleagues cannot 
be sustained as it becomes clear that Butler was motivated by a desire to 
reverse a widely perceived decline in moral and religious values that was 
leading to an increase in crime and permissiveness. In addition, it is 
demonstrated that the straight]acket of the ‘Jenkinsian’ model of Home
Secretaryship gives a distorted view of Home Office history, which detracts 
from our understanding of Butler’s tenure as Home Secretary.
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Introduction
Following his appointment, according to one of Butler’s biographers, ‘Articles 
were written about Butler now setting his mind upon becoming “a great 
reforming Home Secretary” . . . [and] in many ways he did’4 This conclusion 
is shared by many, most notably Anthony Howard whose official biography 
remains the most comprehensive study of Butler’s life and career. Howard’s 
interpretation of Butler, of a capable and progressive politician responsible for 
major social reforms and patron of a generation of liberal ‘One Nation’ Tory
' W. F. Deedes, B rief Lives, (London; Pan Books, 2004), p 45.
 ^ N igel Fisher, H arold Macmillan: A Biography by Nigel Fisher, (London: Weidenfeld and
The Art o f  the Possible: The M emoirs o f  Lord Butler, K.G., C.H. (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1971), p 196. 
idward Pearce, The Lost Leaders: Th 
Brown and Company, 1997), p. 100.
■5
Richard Austen (Rab) Butler was one of the most significant politicians of the 
twentieth century. In a Parliamentary career spanning 35 years, Butler rose to 
the top of government and played a pivotal role in shaping the post-war 
Conservative party. Despite narrowly failing to become Prime Minister on two 
occasions (in 1957 and in 1963), the respected journalist and former 
Conservative MP Bill Deedes considers that Butler ‘left a bigger footprint than 
many Conservative Prime Ministers have done . . .  He stands among the most 
influential British politicians of the last century.’
In January 1957, just hours after missing out on becoming Prime Minister, 
Butler was appointed Home Secretary. Although generally expected to 
succeed the ailing Anthony Eden, Butler was outmanoeuvred by Harold 
Macmillan who was felt to be better able to unite the Conservative party 
following the trauma of the Suez Crisis.^ Macmillan, though, had to find a
senior Cabinet post for his defeated rival and so, despite Butler’s desire to go to 
the Foreign Office, sent Butler to the Home Office.^
Nicolson, 1982), pp 174-76.
 ^ Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, (London: Macmillan, 1971), p 186; and Lord Butler,
E e Best Prime M inisters We N ever H ad  (London: Little,
■
MPs, has been confirmed by subsequent w riters/ However, these writers also 
argue that Butler’s radical instincts were frustrated by those around him and 
that his career was at times impeded by his inability to assert him self Those 
with stronger personalities were able to dominate Butler, Thus Harold 
Macmillan, a shrewd judge of Butler’s character, was able to prevent him from 
becoming Foreign Secretary in January 1957 and to block his bid for the 
Premiership in 1963/ In addition, it is also argued that Butler was unable to 
stand up to his junior Home Office minister David Renton, who has been 
blamed for Butler’s failure to act on the Wolfenden Committee’s 
recommendations on homosexual law reform /
Indeed, it was not just ministerial colleagues but also backbench Tory MPs and 
the mass membership of the Conservative party that acted as a restraint on 
Butler’s reforming instincts. Whilst Butler was able to prevent the re- 
introduction of judicial corporal punishment, he was unable to abolish capital 
punishment (which he came to oppose) and was also forced into illiberal 
legislation to crack down on prostitution and immigration/ Yet Butler Tived 
in his own time and among Conservatives’ and therefore had to formulate his 
policies in such a way as to make them as liberal as possible whilst still being 
able to gain the support of his colleagues in the government and on the 
backbenches.^
Although considered one of the ‘great offices of state’, the post-war Home 
Office has received little attention from contemporary historians. 
Consequently the glimpses into the Home Office that are available are in the 
form of memoirs and biographies of the ministers that served there or in 
general histories of the period that touch on Home Office issues. Flowever, 
from this writing it appears that the idea of the ‘great, reforming Home 
--------------------------------------------
 ^Anthony Howard, RAB: The Life ofR, A. Butler (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986).
Howard, RAB, pp 249-50 & p 318.
’ Ian Gilmour and Mark Garnett, Whatever H appened to the Tories? The Conservatives Since 
1945 (London: Fourth Estate, 1997), p 163.
® Gilmour and Gamett, The Tories, pp 162-4.
 ^Pearce, Lost Leaders, p 101.
Secretary’ has been accepted as the barometer for judging the effectiveness or 
success o f each Secretary of State. According to this interpretation a 
successful Home Secretary is one who embraces social reform, takes a liberal 
approach to contentious moral issues and frustrates reactionary policies on 
crime and punislnnent. Roy Jenkins, during his first stint at the Home Office 
between 1965-7 would be seen as the archetypal Home Secretary according to 
this view. In his memoirs Jenkins portrays himself as a radical taking on 
vested interests to force through reform of the police and prisons, and ensuring 
sufficient Parliamentary time to get the Private Members Bills on homosexual 
law reform and abortion through, whilst using all the authority of his office to 
support these measures.’^  Indeed, the chapter in Jenkin’s memoirs dealing 
with his Home Secretaryship is entitled ‘The Liberal Hour’.
The wi'iting on Butler appears to accept this ‘Jenkinsian’ model of Home 
Secretaryship. In their biographies of Butler, journalists Anthony Howard 
(who dedicated many of his articles in the New Statesman to criticising Butler 
and the Conservative government) and Edward Pearce both argue that Butler’s 
penal policies were consistently progressive, that he implemented a number of 
necessary social reforms, but that his success as Home Secretary was qualified 
by his legislation against prostitution, immigration and his failure to implement 
homosexual law reform. Indeed, Pearce argues that Butler was second only to 
Jenldns in terms of success as a reforming Home Secretary.** Meanwhile, 
former Conservative MP Ian Gilmour, in his treatment of post-war 
Conservative politics, argues that the pre-Thatcherite era was a liberal and 
enlightened period for the party which is reflected by Butler’s policies at the 
Home Office. In this view of Butler it is argued that restrictive policies, such 
as immigration controls, were forced upon him and were the result o f right- 
wing elements within the party scoring some of their few successes.
Roy Jenkins, A Life at the Centre (London: Macmillan, 1991), p 187-90 & 208-10. 
Pearce, Lost Leaders, p. 104.
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When wilting his official biography, Anthony Howard had full access to 
Butler’s private papers, which have been open to researchers for some time 
now. In addition, Howard interviewed Butler’s contemporaries and colleagues
Yet this view of the ideal Home Secretary as liberal reformer contrasts sharply 
with the common opinion of the Home Office, which has developed a 
reputation for being reactionary and a ‘graveyard of free-thinking’.*^  This 
image was epitomised by Sir Frank Newsam, the Permanent Secretary at the i!
Home Office when Butler took over. Newsam ‘was one of Whitehall’s
toughest operators’ who dominated not just his department but also many 
Home Secretaries. When Newsam was eased out shortly after Butler’s arrival 
it was seen in Whitehall as a signal that Butler ‘in contrast to his immediate 
predecessors, meant to be master of his own Department’.*^  Butler selected Sir 
Charles Cunningham as Newsam’s replacement and they were to work closely À
together for the remainder of Butler’s time at the Home Office.*'* However,
■i'ifRoy Jenkins, who inherited Cunningham nine years later, was scathing about
his chief mandarin who, Jenkins argued, was the guardian of ‘a certain Home |
Office approach to life which I was convinced had to be broken’.*^
.1:
■-
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse Butler’s penal and social policies during 
his Home Secretaryship and, through this investigation, to question aspects of 
the above interpretation of Butler’s character and career that have become 
commonly accepted and repeated. Moreover, the thesis will discuss the merits 
of the different sources available to contemporary historians; questioning the 
value of oral history and comparing the information available in private papers 
to that at the National Archives. Finally, the effect of the development of the 
‘Jenkinsian’ model of the ‘great, reforming Home Secretary’ will also be 
examined to evaluate its usefulness to understanding Butler’s Home 
Secretaryship.
,4
Peter Hennessey, Whitehall, (London; Pimlico, 2001), p 457.
Howard, RAB, p 256. t
''' Butler, Art o f  the Possible, p 199.
Jenkins, Life at the Centre, p 181.
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and also had available public sources such as Parliamentary Papers, 
newspapers and journals. However, the Home Office, Prime Ministerial and 
Cabinet files at the National Archives for the period covering Butler’s Home 
Secretaryship had not been opened by the time Howard’s biography was
Simon Ball, ‘Harold Macmillan and the Politics o f Defence. The Market for Strategic Ideas 
during the Sandys Era Revisited’, Twentieth Century British H istory 6 (1995), pp 78-100;
published. This raises the question of the relative value of oral and public 
sources, private papers and the National Archives in the writing of political 
history. By closely examining the files held at the National Archives and 
contrasting this with the information available to Howard a decision can be 
made as to whether a radical re-evaluation of Butler’s Home Secretaryship is 
necessary, or, instead, whether it is purely a matter of challenging certain 
‘points of interpretation’.*^
This re-assessment will be split into two parts. The first part will look at 
‘crime and punishment’ and will concentrate on Butler’s approach to penal and 
prison reform, judicial corporal punishment and capital punishment. Butler has 
gained a reputation as a penal reformer who advocated a new approach to the 
punishment of offenders, which in turn led him into conflict with right-wing 
elements of his party. In addition, the campaign for the restoration of judicial 
corporal punishment and the impassioned debates over the future of the death 
penalty reached a new level during Butler’s Home Secretaryship and did much 
to define his reputation as a liberal and compassionate politician, while 
damaging his relations with the right-wing of the Tory party.
The second part of the thesis will look at the areas of social policy for which 
Butler was responsible. Reform of licensing, gambling and Sunday observance 
laws; the response to the Wolfenden Committee’s report on prostitution and 
homosexuality; and the introduction of legislation to curb immigration from the 
Commonwealth will be examined in this section. Again, Butler’s reputation as
Rodney Lowe, ‘Plumbing N ew  Depths: Contemporary Historians and the Public Record 
O ffice’, Twentieth Century British H istory 8 (1997), pp 239-65; and John Barnes, ‘Books 
and Journals’, in Contem porary History: Practice and Method, ed. by Anthony Seldon 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 30-54,
-12
a reformer has been enhanced by his liberal licensing and gambling reforms, 
but whilst these initiatives have received much praise they have been neglected 
as an area of study. On the other hand, Butler’s failure to act on homosexual 
law reform, as advocated by Wolfenden, and his introduction of legislation |
against prostitutes and to control immigration have been blamed on right-wing 
members of the Conservative party, especially his junior minister David 
Renton. Through this detailed examination of Butler’s penal and social f
policies a decision will be made as to whether he can accurately be described
as ‘a great, reforming Home Secretary’.
a
II
:
13
Part 1 -  Crime and Punishment
Chapter 1 -  Penal Reform
W. F. Deedes, D ear Bill: W F. D eedes Reports (London: Pan Books, 1997), p 124. 
Howard, RAB, pp 255-6,
Howard, RAB, p 255.
Rab Butler is generally regarded as having been an enlightened and progressive 
Home Secretary. Butler’s approach to penal reform has frequently been 
compared favourably to his reforms as President of the Board of Education, f
and, indeed, Butler himself would use this comparison when trying to persuade 
colleagues to support his proposals and to demonstrate his earnestness in 
pursuing certain reforms. O f his achievements in this sphere, one 
contemporary hailed the 1959 White Paper Penal Practice in a Changing 
Society as one of the most important state papers of the twentieth century'^ and 
Anthony Howard believes that it ‘came in Rab’s eyes to rank almost on a par 
with his Education White Paper of 1943 ’. ' ^
And yet, although amongst the most lauded areas of Butler’s work it is also 
possibly the area that has received the least detailed study -  with the debates 
over corporal and capital punishment receiving greater attention. Howard 
devotes just one paragraph to penal reform, instead emphasising the general 
mood created by Butler, that in ‘the climate of the 1950s his was a refr eshingly 
novel approach’.*^  This lack o f detailed study provides an opportunity to 
consider whether the files held at the National Archives can shed new light on 
Butler’s approach at the Home Office. Howard had many sources available to 
him, such as public sources (Parliamentary Papers and newspapers), access to 
former ministerial colleagues and of course Butler’s private papers which are 
now housed at Trinity College, Cambridge. However, it should be noted that
of all the areas of his extensive career it is his time at the Home Office on iytwhich Butler’s private papers seem to have the least information. Moreover,
Rodney Lowe has argued that those who do not access the National Archives
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of policy’/**
In concluding Rolph put forward a number of proposals for reform; advocating 
a change to the very nature of prisons with new, more appropriate, institutions 
for different categories of prisoner; and better training and a new role for 
prison staff. Finally a major public education campaign was necessary to 
tackle the ‘unquestioning apathy’ that existed towards penal matters. Rolph,
‘deny themselves knowledge of ministers’ private remarks during the actual 
determination of policy, which can then be balanced against frequently 
misleading public statements and private confidences. They are also less able 
to judge the vital blend of political and official influence on the ultimate nature
Butler’s first public statement on penal matters came during an Opposition 
sponsored debate on the prison service on 13 March 1957. Although coming 
just two months after his appointment Butler outlined in his speech his vision 
for the future of the prison system. The Home Office files held at the National 
Archives show that, shortly after his appointment, Butler had begun to 
concentrate on penal issues as a result of an article in the New Statesman which 
directly challenged him to reform the prison service. The article, published on 
2 February 1957, was by C. H. Rolph, a member of the executive committee of 
the Howard League for Penal Reform. Rolph addressed his article directly to 
Butler claiming that the new Home Secretary had an ‘opportunity that must be /3:
rare in the history of your office’ as it will ‘not much longer suit the social
21conscience to shrug off the state of the prisons’. Over the next eight pages 
followed a detailed critique of the prison system. Rolph set out the short­
comings of present practice and offered alternative proposals to diverse 
problems; from over-crowding to finding employment for prisoners, 
preventative detention to after-care, and even concern at the ‘barbarous’ and 7
‘stupid anachronism’ that was the Black Maria used to transport prisoners.
Lowe, ‘Plumbing N ew  Depths’, p. 243.
The National Archives (hereafter TNA); Home Office: Criminal Files: HO 291/504, article A
by C. H. Rolph, ‘Prisons and Prisoners’, The New Statesman and Nation, 2 February 1957, p 
135.
TNA: HO 291/504, Rolph, ‘Prison and Prisoners’, pp 136-7.
^■1
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24
TNA: HO 291/504, Rolph, ‘Prison and Prisoners’, pp 141-2.
TNA: HO 291/504, Rolph, ‘Prison and Prisoners’, p 141.
TNA: HO 291/504, minute dated 5 Februaiy 1957.
House o f  Commons Debates, 5'^ ' Series (hereafter H C Debates), vol. 566, cols. 1140-1206 
and 1251-4, 13 March 1957.
H C Debates, vol. 566, cols. 1154-55.
V .
however, accepted that for any of his proposals to be implemented he must first 
convince Butler of the need for reform which Ms why I have written to you at 
such length . . . and urge remedies that I hope you will not resist’.
Although he based his appeal on the belief that Butler already accepted ‘many 
of the ideas in contemporary penology which are well in advance of penal 
practice’,^ '* it is unlikely that Rolph can have anticipated Butler’s reaction to 
this challenge to prove himself a penal reformer. The files at the National 
Archives show that Butler and his junior minister J. E. S. Simon had both read 
the article with ‘great interest’ and sought a meeting with officials to discuss 
the issues raised by Rolph^^ and by 13 February 1957 Butler had received from 
his officials a twelve page memorandum discussing the New Statesman article.
"■Ï
As a result, by the time of the debate Butler was able to clearly outline his
thinking. In his speech Butler spoke of the need for more research to
investigate the causes of crime; the necessity of a prison building programme
to alleviate over-crowding; the desirability of introducing remand centres; the
problems of under-staffing and improving the working conditions of prison
staff; and the problems caused by the lack of constructive work for prisoners.^^
Butler was therefore committing himself to act on a number of the issues on
which he had been challenged by Rolph and was seeking a new approach to the
Prison Service. He concluded his speech declaring that:
I believe that we might one day come to think of our prisons not as 
places o f punislnnent. . . not only as places where offenders are trained 
to be better men and better citizens . . . but also as places where an 
offender could work out his own or her own personal redemption by 
paying his or her debt not only to the society whose order he has 
disturbed, but to the fellow members of that society whom he has 
wronged.^^
__
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This approach drew support from both sides of the House of Commons.
Replying for the Opposition, the Labour MP Anthony Greenwood stated that 
one of the reasons for asking for a debate on the prison service was because he 
hoped that Butler would ‘be a great reforming Home Secretary . . , Certainly, 
the tone of his speech and the breadth of the canvas that he has painted has 
shown that he will live up to the high expectations that we have o f him ’.^ ^
Indeed, it was not just politicians who welcomed Butler’s new approach, but 
also civil servants in the Home Office. Sir Lionel Fox, head of the Prison 
Commission, which was responsible for the day-to-day running of the prison 
service, wrote to Butler to say ‘how exhilarating it has been to have a minister 
who wanted to deliver such a speech’.
However, while Butler was outlining a new approach towards the prison 
system, the Permanent Secretary at the Home Office, the formidable Sir Frank 
Newsam, was anticipating a less active approach towards other areas o f the 
criminal justice system. In April, Newsam minuted Butler to set out proposals 
for future work, which consisted of referring a couple of minor issues to 
Departmental Committees (that were not expected to report until 1961) and the /Ipossibility of establishing a Royal Commission by the end of 1958. In addition 
the Prison Commission would be going ahead, as fai’ as they could, with their 
planned building programme and would look at the problem of employment 
and earnings for prisoners in due course.^**
Given the concentration since early February on the prison service Newsam 
may have been under the impression that Butler’s desire for reform was 
confined to this subject. Indeed Butler made it clear that it was on prisons that 
he wanted to see the most urgent progress. However, there was an air of 
impatience at the lack o f immediate action on the other points outlined by 4
Newsam. Newsam expected eighteen months to pass before any Royal |
HC Debates, vol. 566, col, 1155. :
Papers o f Lord Butler o f  Saffron Walden, Trinity College, Cambridge (hereafter RAB) RAB 4
G31/79, Letter from Sir Lionel Fox to Butler, 15 March 1957.
TNA: HO 291/504, ‘Work in Progress and Planned’, 8 April 1957. 4
' i '
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Commission was appointed, a pause ‘which will help prepare public opinion 
for any radical changes which it may ultimately be thought right to make’. The 
Home Secretary wanted action sooner than this.^* By July Butler’s impatience 
became more apparent after he expressed ‘his urgent wish to see substantial 
progress with penal reform during his period in office, and his great desire to 
help in whatever way he could’, a n d  so decided to hold a two day ‘Round 
Table Talk’ with officials to decide on future action. This took place on 23-24 
July with Butler, junior minister J. E. S, Simon, Newsam and a number of other 
officials present.
Many of the points raised during the discussion were the issues on which 
Butler had sought progress since February. Perhaps the most important was 
the building of alternative institutions suitable for different types of prisoner, 
with new prisons and prison hostels for adult prisoners and borstals and 
attendance centres for young offenders being discussed at length. During this 
discussion it became clear that progress on prison building could be blocked by 
an unsympathetic Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Chancellor, Peter 
Thorneycroft, had written to the Home Office on 15 July arguing that the 
building standards at the recently opened Everthorpe prison were too high and 
that economies should be sought in future building. In addition, the Treasury 
also suggested that for future projects a cost per prisoner ratio should be 
devised which the Prison Commissioners and Ministry of Works should be 
compelled to work to. The minute records that it ‘was agreed that these 
suggestions were unacceptable . . .  If necessary, the Secretary of State might 
raise the matter with the Chancellor It was not surprising that Butler found 
the Treasury’s proposals unacceptable. Butler envisioned a completely new 
approach, with prisons becoming places of rehabilitation and not just of 
punishment. Severe over-crowding in the existing Victorian buildings was 
making this impossible and it was unlikely that Butler would agree to any 
proposal that would mean abandoning the new approach he had outlined.
33
TNA
TNA
TNA
HO 291/504, ‘Work in Progress and Planned’, 8 April 1957. 
HO 291/504, minute dated 1 July 1957.
HO 291/504, minutes o f ‘Round Table Talk’, 23-24 July 1957.
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Finally the desirability of establishing a Royal Commission on penal reform
4was examined. In April, Newsam had suggested a delay in appointing a Royal 
Commission until the end of 1958 as he believed that it would be unwise to 
move too far ahead of public opinion. At the ‘Round Table Talk’ this view 
was explicitly accepted.^'* And yet, within a few months Butler was 
recommending to the Cabinet that a Royal Commission should be appointed
.and that this should be mentioned in that year’s Queen’s Speech. Butler and 
the Lord Chancellor, Lord Kilmuir, circulated a joint memorandum to their 
Cabinet colleagues on 18 October 1957 in which they proposed a Royal 
Commission ‘to consider the administration of justice by the courts of assize 4
and quarter sessions’, Wlien the memorandum was discussed hy the Cabinet 
the Home Secretary explained the need for a Royal Commission into the 
superior courts that would consider what alterations were required ‘to ensure 
that these courts, before passing sentence, would have adequate information 
about the circumstances of offenders convicted before them’.^  ^ As early as his
TNA: HO 291/504, minutes o f ‘Round Table Talk’, 23-24 July 1957.
TNA: Cabinet Memoranda: CAB 129/89, C (57) 236, Administration o f  Justice -
1Commons speech in March 1957, Butler had made it clear that he wanted to 
see prisons not merely as places of punishment but also as places of 
rehabilitation. The proposed Royal Commission was to ensure that the 
superior courts would play their role in that process.
It is not clear what had changed between the ‘Round Table Talk’ in July and 
the joint memorandum in October to make a Royal Commission suddenly 
desirable. Newsam had argued that a movement of public opinion was 
necessary before the Commission was appointed and there is no evidence that 
this had happened. However, there is some evidence to suggest that Butler 
may have accepted less radical terms of reference in order to make progress in 
establishing the Royal Commission. The Home Office files only refer to the
Memorandum by the Secretary o f  State for the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal and 
the Lord Chancellor, 18 December 1957.
TNA: Cabinet Conclusions: CAB 128/31, CC (57) 75''’ Conclusions, Minute 4, Tuesday 22 
December 1957.
g
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\,K 'Commission in general terms, but the Cabinet papers show that Butler and 
Kilmuir’s proposal would be unlikely to make recommendations that would 
horrify Tory hackbenchers or the general public. Instead, the proposed Royal 
Commission was to examine the working of the superior courts and to look at 
ways of providing judges with the most relevant information to enable them to 
pass the most suitable sentence. However, in the Butler Papers at Cambridge, 
notes for a speech to the Law Society that Butler was to make ten years later, in 
October 1967, show that he ‘even thought of abolishing the Assize System 
which has gone on since Henry 11’.^  ^ For Butler to carry out such a radical 
policy would require the recommendation of a body like a Royal Commission 
before the Home Secretary could even consider putting such a controversial 
reform before the Cabinet. Butler and Kilmuir’s proposal would not allow the 
Commission the freedom to make such a recommendation, but rather would 
allow Butler to achieve a more limited measure of reform.
”  RAB K51/1-10, Lecture to the Law Society, ‘Preliminary N otes’, October 1967. 
Roy Jenkins, A Life at the Centre (London: Macmillan, 1991), p 123.
Howard, RAB, p. 256.
..I
Another difference in the circumstances of October 1957 was that just weeks 
after the ‘Round Table Talk’ Sir Frank Newsam had retired and had been 
replaced by Sir Charles Cunningham. There is no evidence to confirm whether 
Newsam’s retirement was significant as far as this issue is concerned. 
However, Newsam’s advice was delay, whilst Butler’s inclination was for 
action; and Newsam’s reputation was of a man who dominated his department 
and some of Butler’s predecessors, whilst Butler’s reputation is of a man who 
could succumb to strong personalities. Yet, Roy Jenkins remembers in his 
dealings with the Home Secretary at this time that Butler was in complete 
command of his officials^^ and the announcement that Newsam was to retire 
was seen throughout Whitehall as a sign that Butler intended to be the master 
of his own department.^^
Whatever the reason for the change of mind over the Royal Commission, the 
proposal was rejected by the Cabinet. Whilst the Cabinet recognised the
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desirability of judges having as much information as possible before passing 
sentence, they also thought that ‘it was no less important to avoid unnecessary 
delay between conviction and sentence’. Moreover, ministers believed that it 
would be dangerous to adopt any proposals that would ‘gradually undermine 
the principle of an itinerant judiciary, which was one of the cardinal features of 
our legal system’. In summing up the discussion Macmillan rejected the 
proposal and suggested that more thought would have to be given to the scope 
of any future review of the administration of justice.'***
TNA: CAB 128/31, CC(57) 75'*’ Conclusions, Minute 4, Tuesday 22 October 1957.
TNA: HO 291/504, minute fi'om R. A. Butler to Sir Charles Cunningham, 28 April 1958.
Therefore, at the end of his first year at the Home Office Butler could point to 
little progress on penal reform. In his speech to the Commons in March, 
inspired by Rolph’s New Statesman article, Butler had set out his vision for the 
future of the Prison Service. However, Butler could provide no new resources 
to the Prison Commissioners, and, indeed, the Chancellor was seeking
,economies in prison building. Furthermore, the Commissioners were 
investigating the difficult problems of work and earnings for prisoners and had 
yet to devise a practicable solution. The one proposal that was put to the 
Cabinet, for a Royal Commission, appears to have been less radical than Butler 
had initially intended, but even this was rejected.
It was not until April 1958 that Butler returned to penal reform, but when he
did it was with far greater determination. On 28 April, Butler wrote to his
Permanent Secretary, Sir Charles Cunningham, to set out how his thinldng had
evolved. Butler wrote:
The more I study the penal system the more I am convinced that we 
must lose no time in laying the foundation for a long term system of 
reform. I have been long enough employed in tasks of this sort to 
realise that what matters is launching the scheme. Its execution may 
have to depend on future circumstances and on other ministers . . .
During the past twelve months I think that we have educated public 
opinion to a point where thinking people are looking for changes. * I
_____________________________
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Butler set out three areas where he wanted to see reform. The first of these, as 
before, was with the prison building programme, of which he believed that ‘we 
need a forward programme, on a scale quite different from anything we have 
envisaged before, phased over say five to ten years’. The second area of 
reform, again an area on which he had failed to find a solution the previous 
year, was employment and earnings for prisoners. However, Butler’s final 
desired area of action was with regard to young offenders; a topic which would 
have to be handled sensitively as Butler recognised ‘the political difficulties we 
may be up against if we appear to relax the penalties against young offenders at 
a time when crime is on the increase’. Nevertheless, Butler believed that this 
should prove no deterrent to looking carefully at the issue. Butler then set out 
how he would like things to proceed, with a memorandum circulated to the 
Cabinet and then a White Paper ‘charting in general terms the course ahead’, 
and concluded that ‘This would be represented as opening a new chapter in 
penal reform, and the pressure of public opinion would help to preserve the
momentum of the advance’.42
(London: Harper Collins, 1996), p 244.
Having informed his Permanent Secretary of his intentions Butler then set 
about gaining the support of his colleagues; starting with the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and the Prime Minister. Thorneycroft, having resigned in January, 
had been replaced by Derick Heathcoat Amory. Had Thorneycroft remained at 
the Treasury there can be some question as to whether Butler would have been 
able to secure the funds for the unprecedented prison building programme that 
he had in mind. Heathcoat Amory, though, was a very different Chancellor, |
who believed the best approach at the Treasury was to ‘fly by the seat of my 
pants’. In reality he was a weak Chancellor who was unable to resist the 
demands of the Prime Minister.'*^ Macmillan, then, was the key.
::3
TNA: HO 291/504, minute from Butler to Cunningham, 28 April 1958.
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Howard, when quoting the correspondence between Butler and Macmillan on 
27 June 1958 describes the Home Secretary’s tone as ‘unusually tough’/'*
Butler’s letter to the Prime Minister certainly reflected his more determined 
approach:
. . .  the longer I remain here, the more it is borne in upon me that the 
main part of my duty consists in taking what steps I can to carry out 
long overdue reforms in our penal system.
I would go further and say that I shall be unable to fulfil my mission 
here unless I find it possible to press forward a comprehensive plan of 
penal reform. As you know, I am as conscious as you or any o f our 
colleagues of the need to lighten the burden on the country’s economy, 
and I have no intention of embarrassing the Chancellor by making 
unreasonable demands on the Exchequer. At the same time I am 
convinced that I must leave behind some permanent record of my 
period of office here or I shall feel not only that I have been disloyal to 4
myself, but also that I have failed in my duty to you and the 
Government which you lead.
on the future cannot but help our Government.'*^
Macmillan, however, was too canny a politician to attempt to block Butler’s 
proposals and replied to the Home Secretary that:
44 Howard, RAB, p 263.
TNA: Prime Minister's Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1951-1964: Ministerial 
discussions on penal reform: PREM 11/4691, correspondence between R. A. Butler and 
Harold Macmillan, 27 June 1958.
O f course it is perfectly possible to hold all this up, through over­
conscientiousness turning into obstruction, but I am convinced from my 
life’s service to reform and public policy that to open up a few windows
Butler, by highlighting his ‘life’s service to reform’, was directly challenging
:the Prime Minister’s radical credentials, while warning Macmillan off if his
intention was to obstruct his plans. Indeed, by stating that he would be ‘unable 
to fulfil my mission’ Butler was hinting at resignation should the Prime 
Minister come out against his proposals.
It would be a fine thing, both for the Government and for your own 
satisfaction, if you could leave behind you the same kind of record of 
your work in the Home Office as you did in the Education Office. I am 
all for it. No doubt it will cost money, but I do not suppose the money 
will be spent very quickly. I take it, it will mostly be building new
I"f;;
i
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prisons, but they will take some time, especially if the Ministry o f 
Works have anything to do with the plans.
This was classic Macmillan. By mentioning Butler’s time at the Board of 
Education, the Prime Minister was indulging his Home Secretary’s reforming 
ardour and at the same time damning Butler with faint praise by suggesting that 
the extent of his plans would ‘be mostly building new prisons’ which would, in 
any event, take some time to complete.
TNA: PREM 11/4691, correspondence between Macmillan and Butler, 27 June 1958.
TNA: CAB 129/93, C (58) 136, Prison Reform -  Memorandum by the Secretaiy o f  State for 
the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal, 30 June 1958; and TNA: CAB 128/32, CC (58)
52 Conclusions, Minute 6, Thursday 3 July 1958.
Having secured the support of the Prime Minister and Chancellor, Butler
brought his proposals to the Cabinet. That he wanted to ‘leave behind a #
permanent record’ of his time at the Home Office was not an argument likely 
to win over other ministers. Butler therefore argued that prison over-crowding 
was both an effect and a cause of the recent increase in crime; that this was
■ ; "preventing staff from doing constructive work with prisoners, which in turn ?
was leading to higher rates of re-offending; that out-dated buildings were 
disproportionately expensive to run and maintain; and that public concern at 
the increase in crime ‘compels us to show that we are exerting ourselves
Butler’s proposal was that the Cabinet should agree that he and the Chancellor 
should look into securing the resources for a greatly expanded building 
programme and that steps should be taken by the Home Office to put together a 
White Paper on penal reform. However, it is clear from the memorandum 
Butler circulated to the Cabinet that he had more in mind than just building f
prisons. The Home Secretary’s memorandum included a proposal to put in 
place systems to give judges more information on the offender before them so 
that they could pass the most suitable sentences. This was the policy that had 
been rejected by the Cabinet the previous October when they vetoed the Royal 
Commission proposal. Moreover, Butler was increasingly moving his attention 'ÏÏtowards tackling youth crime and had in mind ‘a specialised system of 
--------------------------------------------
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treatment for all young offenders, based on a re-assessment of the present 
systems provided by law’."^  ^ However, there was some reluctance amongst 
members of the Cabinet to committing resources to prison building as some felt 
that ‘increased capital expenditure was overdue in other social services, 
notably the hospital service’. Nevertheless, a White Paper on penal reform was 
felt to be ‘timely and appropriate’ and Butler was given the green light to go 
ahead with planning his reforms."^^
Work then began in earnest at the Home Office in preparing the White Paper. 
By the end o f the year Butler was able to circulate a draft to the Cabinet. 
Briefing the Prime Minister the Deputy Cabinet Secretary, Sir Burke Trend, 
reported to Macmillan that ‘it is a very good White Paper -  well written; 
forward looking; and evenly balanced as between the liberal and the severe 
approaches to this subject, without conceding so much to the former as to be 
merely sentimental’,^  ^ a view shared by the C a b i n e t . W i t h  the Cabinet’s 
agreement. Penal Practice in a Changing Society was published in February 
1959. The White Paper sought to address the ‘disquieting feature of our 
society’ that crime had increased since 1939 despite the rise in prosperity and 
education standards and the creation of the Welfare State since the end of the 
War. The assumption that poverty and crime were linked was being 
challenged and therefore a completely new approach to penal matters was 
required.
The tone of Penal Practice was very similar to that of Butler’s speech to the 
Commons in March 1957. When discussing the purpose of prisons, the White 
Paper agreed with the conclusion of the 1895 Gladstone Committee that the 
‘constructive function of our prisons is to prevent the largest possible number
TNA: CAB 129/93, C (58) 136, Prison Reform -  Memorandum by the Secretary o f State for 
the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal, 30 June 1958.
TNA: CAB 128/32, CC (58) 52'"' Conclusions, Minute 6, Thursday 3 July 1958.
TNA: PREM 11/4691, memorandum from Sir Burke Trend to Macmillan, 15 December 
1958.
TNA: CAB 128/32, CC (58) 85* Conclusions, Minute 3, 16 December 1958.
Parliamentary Papers (hereafter PP): Penal Practice in a Changing Society: Aspects o f  
Future Development (England and Wales), HMSO, 1959 (645).
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of those committed to their care from offending again’. This meant that the 
primary role of prison was rehabilitation. Penal Practice rejected the argument 
that a more progressive regime would reduce the deterrence value of prison and 
instead argued that it was the loss of liberty that would have the most effect on 
the prisoner. However, during their confinement prisoners should be given the 
best and most appropriate training in order that they would not fall back into 
old habits once they had been released, which would be continued tlii’ough a 
system of ‘after-care’ that would continue to support offenders once they had 
been freed. In addition, prison over-crowding and a lack of remand centres 
was to be solved by a major building programme; understaffing was to be 
tackled by improving the working conditions and training of prison officers; 
research to try and understand better the causes of crime would be carried out; 
and a solution was to be found to the problem of securing appropriate work for 
prisoners as well as improving the system of earnings.
Another significant inclusion in the White Paper was proposals on the 
administration of justice. Having failed a year earlier to gain Cabinet approval 
to appoint a Royal Commission, Butler found a different vehicle for the 
enquiry he deemed necessary. In Penal Practice, Butler and Kilmuir 
announced that they had established an Interdepartmental Committee, under 
the chairmanship of Mr Justice Streatfeild, to investigate the workings of the 
superior c o u r t s . T h e  remit of the Streatfeild Committee was remarkably 
similar to that envisioned for the Royal Commission; and, indeed, would be 
more flexible and would report more quickly than a Royal Commission.
Streatfeild’s Committee had been established in June 1958 and it was nearly 
three years before it completed its work. In February 1961 the Committee 
published its report which proposed important changes to trial procedures; 
including proposals to reduce the time spent in custody for those awaiting trial, 
an attempt to reduce the pressure on the Superior Courts and recommendations 
on the general organisation of courts of assize and quarter sessions. In addition
PP: Penal Practice, p 4.
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the Committee made recommendations for better providing courts with 
relevant information on the person convicted that would allow judges to select 
the most appropriate s e n t e n c e . M a n y  of these recommendations could be 
introduced without legislation and steps were taken to implement the changes; 
but the proposals that did require legislation were implemented in the Criminal 
Justice Administration Bill which was introduced in the 1961-62 Parliamentary 
session and passed quickly through Parliament. Perhaps the most important 
change included in the Bill, as far as Butler was concerned, was to allow courts 
of assize to adjourn after conviction so that the judge could order more 
information on the offender before passing sentence.
In addition to the Streatfeild Committee, Penal Practice had also announced 
the establishment o f the Criminal Law Revision Committee, under the 
chairmanship of Lord Justice Sellers; which Butler used twice during his Home 
Secretaryship. The first issue to be referred to the Committee was the law 
relating to indecency with children, which the Sellers’ Committee quickly 
considered and recommended a short Bill that would give added protection to 
children under 14 years of age.^^ Butler acted quickly and introduced an 
Indecency with Children Bill that rapidly passed thiough Parliament; with the 
only dissenting voice that of the Tory MP Percy Browne who argued that sex 
offenders should be birched.
Butler then asked Sellers’ Committee to consider the law relating to suicide 
and attempted suicide. As no criminal proceedings had understandably been 
launched against those who had successfully committed suicide, and with the 
Home Office recommending that those who attempted suicide should not be 
prosecuted except where there was no family or friends to care for them, Butler 
argued that the offence should be abolished and instead would best be dealt 
with in a Mental Heath Bill. The Cabinet’s Home Affairs Committee agreed
- t :
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and referred the matter to the Sellars Committee to consider the consequent
repercussions should these offences be abolished. Macmillan, however, was 4
' I 'alarmed by the proposal and began to argue that the Home Affairs Committee’s 
decision should be brought before a full meeting of the Cabinet, presumably to 
have the matter quashed. However, he was reluctantly persuaded to accept the 
decision to refer the issue to Sellars’ committee, and, by doing this he was 
effectively committed to accepting whatever Sellars recommended.^^
Again the Criminal Law Revision Committee reported quickly and set out a 4
draft Bill, but, due to the pressure on Parliamentary time and the low priority
attached to the legislation, the Bill was not introduced until February 1961,
nearly two years after Butler had first raised the issue. To make best use of the
little time available, it was decided to introduce it in the House of Lords first,
rather than the C o m m o n s . H o w e v e r ,  the Prime Minister remained
unconvinced and wrote to ask Butler:
Must we really proceed with the Suicides Bill? I think we are opening 
ourselves to chaff if, after ten years of Tory Government, all we can do 
is to produce a Bill allowing people to commit suicide. I don’t see the 
point of it. It is just to please a few cranky peers. I don’t mind these 
noblemen if they commit suicide (which they seldom do) being buried 
in their damp mausoleums instead of at a crossroads with a stake 
through their bodies, but beyond that I do not see why we should go.^^
I
This is a remarkable letter. The Prime Minister was asking for a Bill to be 
dropped after it had passed all its stages in the House of Lords, had received its 
Second Reading in the Commons; had been recommended by a committee of 
experts established by his Home Secretary; and had been agreed by his own 
Cabinet. In addition, there was no public concern over the proposed 
legislation, which had generally gone unnoticed, and to which there was no
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opposition in Parliament.^  ^ Macmillan alone seemed opposed to the Bill, 
which became law later in the summer of 1961.
Butler’s commitment to penal reform seems to fit with the idea of the ‘great 
reforming Home Secretary’. Given his dedication to the subject over his four 
and a half years at the Home Office, it is difficult to argue that the New 
Statesman article by C. H. Rolph is alone the explanation for Butler’s desire for 
reform. Rather, it is more likely that Rolph’s article struck a chord with Butler 
and inspired early action. Yet, in his first year Butler achieved little. It is 
difficult to assess either the effect Newsam had in frustrating reform or the 
extent to which Butler compromised on the terms of reference of a Royal 
Commission, but, in any event, the Cabinet rejected the proposal. And even if 
the most negative view of Newsam is taken, that he was attempting to obstruct 
Butler’s penal policies, this was not an approach shared by all Home Office 
civil servants, with Sir Lionel Fox ‘exhilarated’ by Butler’s Commons speech 
and desire for reform.
of the courts through the Streatfeild Committee and also to ensure the 
effectiveness of the criminal law with the committee chaired by Lord Justice
HC Debates, vol. 645, cols. 822-5, 28 July 1961.
However, from April 1958 Butler showed far greater determination. Having 
outlined his thinking to his new Permanent Secretary, Butler secured the 
support of the Prime Minister and Chancellor and then convinced the Cabinet 
of the need for progress, especially in regard to reforming the prisons. Penal 
Practice in a Changing Society set out plans for progress on prison building, 
work and earnings for prisoners, improved training and conditions for prison 
staff, and research into the causes of crime. In addition to looking at the prison I
system, Penal Practice also set out plans for the improvement of the working I
Sellers.
I
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The National Archives prove a valuable resource for those examining Butler’s 
approach to penal reform. While there is little in Butler’s private papers on this 
subject, the National Archives allow an examination of the evolution of 
Butler’s penal policy from its genesis to implementation; with the impact of 
Rolph’s article on inspiring Butler into action and the extraordinary letter from 
Macmillan on the Suicide Bill revealed. However, it is Butler’s Archive at 
Cambridge that suggest Butler was frustrated in his desire for a more radical 
terms of reference for the proposed Royal Commission, an issue on which the 
Home Office files are vague.
Yet, it was not just in his approach to the prison service, court system and 
criminal law that Butler demonstrated his commitment to refonn. Tliroughout 
his Home Secretaryship the problem of rising youth crime came increasingly to 
the public’s attention. Butler’s approach to the problem, however, was to bring 
him into conflict with many in his own party.
AiIA
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Chapter 2 -  Youth Crime and Corporal Punishment
Although Butler was making progress with his reforms to the prison service, 
court system and criminal law, his work on these issues was increasingly over­
shadowed by the debate over how best to tackle the rise in juvenile 
delinquency. In April 1958, in the same letter in which he set out his renewed 
determination to reform the penal system, Butler raised the necessity at looking 
carefully at the rise in crime committed by young people. Butler recognised 
the ‘political difficulties we may be up against if  we appear to relax the 
penalties against young offenders at a time when crime is on the increase’, but 
nevertheless felt that a close examination of the issue was required.*^  ^
However, many members of the Conservative party believed they already had 
the solution to this problem and began campaigning for the restoration of 
judicial corporal punishment.
As has been seen in chapter one, Butler’s White Paper Penal Practice in a 
Changing Society tackled many of the issues that Butler had been working on 
since his appointment. Yet, a marked shift of emphasis had taken place by the 
time of its publication as the White Paper had come to concentrate heavily on 
youth crime. When it was considered by the Cabinet it was the provisions on 
young offenders that received greatest attention, with the rise in youth crime 
attributed by ministers to ‘a decline in spiritual values among the younger 
section of the adult population’. It was therefore agreed that the Home 
Secretary should convene an informal conference with representatives of the 
churches, educational authorities and youth services to discuss the issue and 
attempt to identify possible solutions.
Butler approached the issue of youth crime in the same considered way that he 
did with other aspects of penal reform. After rejecting the knee jerk reaction of 
restoring judicial corporal punishment, he instead extended his ideas of more
TNA: HO 291/504, minute fi'om Butler to Cunningham, 28 April 1958.
TNA: CAB 128/32, CC (58) 85* Conclusions, Minute 3, 16 December 1958,
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appropriate sentencing; improved and more suitable prison accommodation; 
effective, positive training; and research into the causes o f crime, to young 
offenders as he had to adult prisoners.®"  ^ Butler believed that the very nature of 
imprisonment, isolation from the rest of society, was punishment enough. The 
State’s job was then to rehabilitate the offender and prevent recidivism,^^
Whilst he rejected the physical punishment through the use of the birch, Butler 
did believe in the effectiveness of the ‘short, sharp shock’. Locking three 
prisoners in a cell only intended for two for twenty-three hours a day and 
putting young offenders in adult prisons would do nothing to prevent re­
offending. Instead it would be more effective to have dedicated institutions for 
different categories of offender, where they would receive the intensive and 
disciplined training that was most appropriate to them. This would be followed 
by a period of compulsory supervision in the community following release. It 
is this approach to youth crime that Butler advocated. |
IThis approach was not new. Ten years earlier the Labour Home Secretary 
Chuter Ede had introduced a number of reforms - abolishing corporal 
punisliment, reducing the power of the courts to imprison offenders under 21 
years of age and introducing attendance, detention and remand centres.*^^
However, financial constraints in the intervening ten yeai'S in addition to a lack 
of political will meant that no remand or attendance centres for 17 to 21 year 
olds had been built and only four detention centres had been established.
Butler therefore proposed in his White Paper to accelerate the building 
programme to ensure that fewer young offenders would end up in adult 
prisons. In addition, the borstal system would be integrated with imprisonment 
to provide a new custodial system for young offenders that were sentenced to 
more that six months detention.^^ Butler was therefore seeking to build on the 
start that had been made by Ede. For many backbench Tory MPs and for the
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majority of the membership of the Conservative party, however, the best way 
to re-instil traditional values was to restore traditional punishments.
In 1938 the Cadogan Committee had unanimously recommended the abolition 
of corporal punishment. This was not due to any objection in principle, but 
because ‘we have come to the conclusion that, as a court penalty, corporal 
punishment is not a suitable or effective method of dealing with young 
offenders’. B y  that time birching had effectively been abolished as a 
punishment for adult offenders, but was still available for any indictable 
offence committed by a boy under the age of 14 years, and for boys under the 
age of 16 years convicted of certain crimes against the person, for offences of 
larceny or malicious damage to property.
Where a boy was sentenced to be whipped, a nine ounce birch would be used 
for those over the age of ten years old, and a six ounce birch for those under 
ten. The statutory requirement was that the birching should take place in 
private; as soon as possible after sentencing; by a police constable in the
PP: Report o f  the Departm ental Committee on Corporal Punishment, 1937-38, HMSO, 
1938 (5684), p. 34 and p. 124.
™ PP: Report on Corporal Punishment, pp. 3-5.
PP: Report on Corporal Punishment, pp. 3-18.
presence of another officer of senior rank; and in the presence, if desired, of a
parent or guardian. In addition, the Home Office had issued guidance in 1925 i
which recommended that a medical examination should take place before the
birching was inflicted and that regard should be had for the physical condition |
of the b o y .'’ -I
Coi'poral punishment, then, was mainly used as a sentence for offences 
committed by boys under the age of 16 years, and was quickly inflicted after 
conviction. Yet there had been a steady decline in the number of birchings 
ordered each year. In 1900 a total of 3,385 whippings had taken place; which 
had fallen to 1,380 in 1920; and, by 1936, was down to 166. Cadogan’s 
Committee found that ‘the decreased use of the birch is due entirely to
I
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increased use of other methods now available to the courts for dealing with ;|
■V:
young offenders’7^ Therefore, as a punishment available to the courts birching 
had effectively been replaced by more modern punishments. The only 
circumstance in which Cadogan recommended retention was for extreme 
offences against discipline in adult prisons. However, due to the intervention 
of the war it was not until 1948 that Parliament had an opportunity to 
implement the Cadogan recommendations, which it did despite the opposition 
of some Tory MPs. ;;I
INot long after the Conservative party had been returned to government in 1951 
pressure started to build for the re-introduction of corporal punishment. David 
Maxwell-Fyfe was the first Tory Home Secretary to come under pressure from 
the flogging lobby, which he resisted despite the Prime Minister, Sir Winston 
Churchill, having considerable sympathy with those campaigning for the return 
of the birch. Maxwell-Fyfe countered by arguing that not enough time had 
passed to properly gauge the effect of abolition and that it would therefore be 
inappropriate to take any action.^^ Nevertheless, the issue continued to simmer 
tliroughout the remainder of the 1950s, with motions regularly put to the party 
conference calling for the re-introduction of the birch.^"^
PP: Report on Corporal Punishment, p. 20.
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Butler’s first major encounter with the flogging lobby in his own party did not 
come until October 1958, during the party conference debate on home affairs.
When describing the conference agenda, Butler told Sir Charles Cunningham 
that he would be faced with ‘28 bloodthirsty resolutions’ and that it was ‘with 
the greatest o f difficulty that we have chosen one out of the 28 which is at least 
m o d e r a t e A f t e r  the conference debate The Times reported that ‘When the 
stormy clamour for the return of flogging, birching, and more hanging by the 
neck burst over the Conservative conference to-day it seemed impossible that f
the Home Secretary, a dedicated reformer, would be able to ride and direct it.
34
But he managed it, and with an infinitude of skill’ Yet  this conference 
victory did nothing to change the minds of the party membership, and, instead, 
the campaign for restoring corporal punishment started to gain momentum. In 
his memoirs Butler himself admitted that it was not until 1961 that he finally 
gained ascendancy on this issue.
From the end of 1959 Butler started to face persistent pressure from within the 
Parliamentary party to restore corporal punishment. In October 1959 Lord 4
Parker, who had recently become Lord Chief Justice, made a speech to the 
annual meeting of the Magistrates’ Association in which he, to loud applause, 
announced himself in favour of shorter prison sentences in conjunction with 
corporal punishment rather than long s e n t e n c e s . W h e n  Parliament met in 
November following the general election, Butler started to come under 
pressure from Conservative MPs. The maverick Tory backbencher Gerald 
Nabarro suggested ‘that a proper policy ought to be to “whack the thugs’” , 
and Sir Thomas Moore, who was to become the unofficial leader of the 
Parliamentary floggers, argued that Butler was out of touch with both public 
opinion and the highest legal opinion in the c o u n t r y . B u t l e r  replied that he 
understood the pressure on this matter but that ‘we eannot solve crime by a 
single method such as this . . .  I am not at all frightened of discussing the 
matter, but let us discuss it on its merits’.
Such was the pressure on Butler, however, that he agreed to the suggestion of 
another flogger, Norman Panned, to refer the issue to the Advisory Council on 
the Treatment of O f f e n d e r s . I n  agreeing to this inquiry, Butler was taking the 
calculated risk that the Advisory Council, of which he had had extensive 4
experience throughout his Home Secretaryship, would confirm the results of
The Times, ‘Mr Butler wins the day on criminal reform’, 10 October 1958, p. 12.
Butler, Memoirs, p. 201.
The Times, ‘Lord Parker on “upsurge in crime’” , 23 October 1959.
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was a risk, though, for Butler would be committed to the recommendations of 
his own Advisory Council. Having declared himself opposed to corporal 
punishment, Butler would look extremely foolish and his reforming image 
would be tarnished if the Advisory Council reported in favour of restoration, 
especially as the responsibility for bringing forward legislation would fall to 
him.
83 TNA: HO 291/836, ACTO Enquiry into corporal punishment, evidence fi’om Lord Chief 
Justice, 1960.
TNA: HO 291/836, ACTO Enquiry into corporal punishment, evidence from Conservative 
MPs, 1960.
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Athe Cadogan Committee, which had reported more than twenty years earlier. It
A:
I
During the course of its investigation the Advisory Council took evidence from
a number of people, including representatives of the judiciary. Members of
Ail'Parliament and also from members of the public. Appearing before the 
Council, Lord Parker argued that corporal punishment should be re-introduced 
for use in exceptional circumstances. For example, those convicted for 
involvement in the Notting Hill race riots should have been birched and 
received shorter sentences, according to Parker, instead of the long sentences 
that had been handed down.^^ In addition, six Conservative MPs, including 
Moore and Pannell, also gave evidence to the Advisory Council, in which they 
advocated restoration as an effective method of meeting the rise in juvenile 
delinquency.®'^
A
A
The Advisory Council also received written evidence, including a 
memorandum from the Liverpool Garston Conservative Association, which 
provides a good example of the feelings of grassroots Conservative activists.
-A;
In its submission the Garston Conservatives declared that:
Throughout Liverpool residents fear, and fear with good reason, that the 
danger to old persons, young girls and persons incapable of self- 
defence of being insulted, molested or assaulted in the streets at night 
by groups of youths or young adults is such that it cannot be said safe 
for such persons to go out at night unaccompanied. I
■4
■I
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Coincidentally, just as the Criminal Justice Bill was introduced in Parliament, 
the Advisory Council on the Treatment of Offenders also published its report.
I
They argued many such crimes went um’eported, that the statistics of such 
incidents were therefore unreliable and so they preferred the ‘evidence of 
feeling among residents’. Superficially there seemed many penalties available 
to tackle this menace, but it was argued that many o f these penalties existed 
only in official memoranda, and, consequently, many young people felt 
themselves to be beyond the law; and even when they did go before a court 
they received only mild sentences. The answer, according to the Garston 
Conservatives, was ‘retribution, by which corporal punishment is meant . . . 
which is needed, if  only because no-one has been able to produce a more- 
effective one’.®^
As the Advisory Council carried out its investigation the Home Office 
continued to work on a Criminal Justice Bill that was intended to implement 
the proposals contained in Penal Practice relating to young offenders. Butler 
had received the approval of the Cabinet’s Home Affairs Committee to begin 
work on the Bill in July 1959,®  ^ but drafting had been dogged by delays. 
Further delay was caused by the publication of the Durand Report into the 
disturbances at the Carlton Approved School®^ and then by the publication of
the report of the Ingleby Committee on Children and Young Persons, as Butler 
preferred to have these recommendations in the Bill from the outset rather than 
be forced to include them under pressure from the Opposition once the Bill had 
been introduced in Parliament.®® The Criminal Justice Bill was finally ready to |
be introduced to the House of Commons in November 1960.
'A'
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.The Council’s report recognised that a large proportion of the general public
and judiciary were in favour of restoration, although it also highlighted the 
.point that it was desired for a much wider range of offences, including all
crimes of violence and some sexual offences, than it had been available for
prior to abolition.®^ The Report went on:
In view of the great conflict of opinion on this subject, it would have 
been surprising if, at the outset of our enquiry, some of us had not 
thought that the réintroduction of judicial corporal punishment might be 
justified as a means o f checking the growing increase in crime 
generally and in offences of hooliganism in particular. That was, in 
fact, the case, but, having studied the views expressed to us and the 
available evidence, we consider that the findings of the Cadogan 
Committee are still valid, and have come unanimously to the 
conclusion that corporal punishment should not be reintroduced as a 
judicial penalty in respect of any categories of offences or of 
offenders.^^
If.
The Advisory Council found that there was no evidence to prove that corporal 
punishment was an especially effective deterrent and instead found that it
would frustrate successful reformative treatment. Moreover, the Council 
argued that many of the provisions of the 1948 Act had not yet been tried and 
therefore it was necessary to implement them before gauging their success; and 
that there were significant practical difficulties as neither the police, prison or 
probation services wanted the responsibility for carrying out the punishment. 
In addition it was felt that the delay from the commission of the crime through 
to eventual punishment could be particularly harmful to young offenders. 
Furthermore, the Council pointed out that those who were seeking re- 
introduction wanted it as a punishment for a whole host of offences for which it 
was never previously applicable and ‘If that were to be done it would mean 
putting the clock back not twelve years but a hundred years’. Finally, the
Advisory Council argued that restoration would be damaging to the country’s
38 Ç
reputation abroad as it would mean abandoning ‘enlightened methods of penal 
treatment’.^ * "
all convicted offenders were aged between 14 and 21 years/^ This highlighted
PP; Report o f  Advisory Council, pp. 26-7.
HC Debates, vol. 630, col. 562, 17 November 1960. 
HC Debates, vol. 630, col. 563, 17 November 1960. 
HC Debates, vol. 630, cols. 564-9, 17 November 1960.
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Going into the Second Reading debate o f the Criminal Justice Bill, on 17 
November 1960, Butler was thus armed with another report that argued against 
the re-introduction of corporal punishment. Opening the debate, Butler made it 
clear that youth crime was the main target of the Bill, as in 1959 one-third of i
the scale of the problem that the Bill was designed to address. However, there 
were no easy solutions and Butler urged caution on those who looked for 
simplistic remedies, stating that ‘We cannot solve the problem of crime just by |
passing Acts of Parliament’.^  ^ Rather, Butler argued, the whole of society 
needed to be engaged in the fight against crime. Recourse to legislation was 
only one tool in combating crime, along with the police and probation services, 
the powers and effectiveness of the courts, and the condition of the nation’s 
prisons.^'^ The Bill had to be seen in that context. 4
Having placed the Bill into what he considered its proper perspective, Butler 
then went on to highlight its main features. Many of these were putting into 
action the proposals in Penal Practice in a Changing Society, in addition to the 
recommendations that had emerged from the Ingleby and Durand reports. The 
Bill outlined the future pattern of borstal accommodation, detention and 
attendance centres; the future of approved schools; and extended the system of 
after-care to young offenders. The effect of the Bill would be to immediately 
abolish the remaining powers o f the courts to imprison offenders under the age 
of 17 and, as space in borstals, detention and attendance centres became 
available, the Home Secretary would be able to extend that prohibition to all 
offenders under tbe age of 21. Yet Butler stressed that the reduction in the 
powers of the courts to send offenders under the age of 21 to adult prisons did
had come down in favour of no change.^® Having thus rubbished the report the
not mean a softening of the system for young offenders. The institutions that 
these offenders could be sent to would be governed by the principle of the 
‘short, sharp shock’; a positive but disciplined regime aimed at rehabilitation 
and at reducing recidivism.
Indeed, when tackling the issue of corporal punishment Butler was again keen 
to demonstrate that his proposals did not constitute a softer approach to 
juvenile delinquency. Instead, the Criminal Justice Bill included ‘new and 
severe’ measures to tackle youth crime, but the re-introduction of corporal 
punishment was not one of them. Butler’s judgement that it would be wrong to 
bring back corporal punishment had been confirmed by the Advisory Council 
on the Treatment of Offenders and, although he was prepared to have a long 
debate on the matter during the passage of the Bill, he made it clear that he and 
the government as a whole were convinced by the findings of the report.
a
Even with the Advisory Council coming out against corporal punishment, its 
supporters on the Tory backbenches had no intention of giving up the fight.
Instead, Sir Thomas Moore argued that the Advisory Council had relied 
heavily on the Cadogan Report, which was no longer relevant due to the huge 
social changes that had taken place since 1938. Whereas in 1938 crimes of 
violence were carried out for economic reasons, with the advent of the Welfare 
State these reasons no longer existed and now ‘They are committed sometimes 
for excitement, sometimes fi'om frustrated lust, and even, as I have previously 
said, sometimes apparently for the fun o f the thing’. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  Moore 
argued that there seemed to be some conflict within the Advisory Council over 
the issue (despite protests to the contrary from the Conservative MP John 
Hobson who was a member of the Council)^^ which was the reason why they f1
ÏHC Debates, vol. 630, cols. 565-7, 17 November 1960. %
H C Debates, vol. 630, col. 606, 17 November I960.
HC Debates, vol. 630, col. 616, 17 November 1960. |
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4I
40
floggers could safely continue their campaign to have corporal punishment 
included in the Bill.
Not only did Butler have problems with the flogging element in his own party, 
the Opposition also had criticisms of certain aspects of the Bill which they did 
not believe to be liberal enough. Having first blamed the government for 
having fostered ‘a society in which material advancement, personal success, 
selfishness and disregard for one’s neighbours are e n c o u r a g e d a n d  therefore 
responsible for the rise in crime, Patrick Gordon Walker raised the 
Opposition’s three principal concerns. The first was the reduction of the age at 
which a boy could be sentenced to detention in a borstal, which was to be 
reduced from 16 to 15 years of age. Although it was intended that eventually 
no offender under the age of 21 would serve their sentence in an adult prison, 
young offenders would end up in prison because of the lack o f borstal 
accommodation. There would not be sufficient borstal accommodation until 
Butler’s building programme was well under way, which would be sometime 
after the Bill had been passed. Therefore, for that period, offenders as young 
as 15 years could find themselves in adult prisons. Indeed, Gordon Walker
H C Debates, vol. 630, cols. 586-7, 17 November 1960. 
HC Debates, vol. 630, cols. 582-3, 17 November 1960.
questioned whether the building programme was extensive enough, and if it 
was not, then this would be a permanent problem that would plague the 
system.
A similar objection to the Bill was over the reduction, from 12 to 10 years, of 
the age at which children could be sent to approved schools. Gordon Walker 
argued that this was too young an age for boys to be brought into the penal
.4 'system. In addition he argued that greater state control over approved schools
was necessary, with integration with the education system rather than the penal |
system being more appropriate. Indeed, the Opposition later went on to argue
Ai
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that this part of the legislation should have been included in a Children and | |
Young Persons Bill rather than a Criminal Justice Bill.
A 
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Gordon Walker’s third criticism was over the issue of offenders that defaulted 
on the terms of their probation. The Bill allowed for the recall to prison for
-any offender whose Probation Officer reported a serious breach of the terms of 
their probation. The offender would then be recalled to prison by the 
administrative procedures that would be operated by the Home Office. Gordon f
Walker argued that this should be a judicial rather than an administrative 
matter, with the Home Office having to demonstrate to a court that an offender 
had breached the terms of their probation. It would therefore be for a judge, 
rather than a Home Office official, to decide whether an offender should be 
returned to prison, Despite these concerns the Labour party decided to 
support the Bill, while seeking amendments, and the Bill received its Second 
Reading unopposed.
While the Bill was making its way through Parliament the floggers made two 
attempts to amend it to include corporal punishment. The first attempt was §
heavily defeated during the Committee Stage by 26 votes to six, with all the 
Opposition MPs on the Committee voting with the govermnent.^'^^ However, 4when the Bill returned to the floor of the House of Commons for the Report 
Stage, Sir Thomas Moore tabled another amendment. Moore’s amendment 
proposed to empower the courts to pass a sentence of corporal punishment on 
young male offenders under the age of 21 for a second, or subsequent, 
conviction for any crime of violence. This would be an alternative sentence for 
judges and magistrates from sending these offenders to detention centres. Boys 
under the age of 17 would be given the cane, whilst those between the ages of
17 and 21 would be birched. Speaking in favour of his amendment, Moore |Asaid that the vast majority of public and judicial opinion was on his side; that 
_____________________________
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social conditions had changed significantly since abolition was advocated in
1938, as crimes of violence were now motivated by thuggery rather than want;
and that he rejected the contention that there was no deteri'ent value in corporal
punishment. Rather, Moore believed that any young offender would be
deterred by the realisation that, if they were convicted again, they would be
caned or birched. He continued:
We do not agree with those whose humanity and reforming zeal 
appears to be almost entirely directed to the criminal. Our sympathy 
goes to the victim . . . Instead of waiting until a crime of violence has 
been committed, and then setting out to reform the wrong-doer and 
evil-doer, we believe it better to deter him. As I have said before, we 
would put the horse in front of the cart.*^^
Of the nine backbench Tory MPs to take part in the debate, eight argued in 
favour of the re-introduction of corporal punisliment. At times the floggers’ 
speeches turned into personal attacks against the Home Secretary, as they 
accused Butler of putting his reforming zeal before his responsibility to protect 
the p u b l i c . I n  an almost hysterical contribution the Conservative MP 
Geoffrey Hirst attacked Butler for being out of line with the opinions of the 
vast majority o f the Conservative party ‘of which, on paper at least, he is a 4
leader’ and condemned the Home Secretary for so lowering ‘the standard 
which he represents as to fall back on such dishwash for his argument s’. y 
The ‘dishwash’ was the Advisory Council report, which had only been ■k
commissioned to satisfy the demands of the floggers.
In reply, whilst recognising the sincerity of conviction of the floggers, Butler
attacked them for becoming obsessed by the issue, especially as they seemed to |
be suggesting it was the sole answer to the crime problem. The amendment,
Butler argued, would extend corporal punishment to offences that it had not
been applicable for since 1861, and went on to say that the statistics showed
that since abolition there had in fact been a reduction in the number of crimes
committed for which the birch was previously available. Furthermore, the Bill 
_____________________________
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«sixty-five hostile resolutions on the conference agenda, Butler did indeed make 
a very good speech in which he argued against corporal punishment and in 
favour of his r e f o r m s Y e t ,  while Butler had made a good speech, his 
success can be attributed more to the stage managing of the conference debate. 
Butler had continually been singled out, both in Parliamentary and conference
HC Debates, vol. 638, cols. 89-97, 11 April 1961.
The Times, ’69 Conservatives defy leaders on flogging; Home Secretary derided’, 12 April 
1961, p. 12.
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before the House was full of alternatives to bringing back a punishment which
'
he, and many others, felt to be ‘repugnant’.
■Ï
When the amendment was finally forced to a vote the floggers were heavily i
defeated. All the support for the amendment, though, came from the 
Conservative backbenches, with a total of 69 MPs defying the government 
Whip.*^^ Butler had managed to win the day (with a large number of Labour
:
MPs propping up the government’s majority) and successfully defeated the 
rebels. Yet this had only been achieved following a heated debate in which the 
whole motive and effectiveness of Butler’s approach to youth crime had been 
bitterly criticised by many members of his own party, and had received only 
lukewarm support from the Labour benches. The defeat of the floggers, 
however, did bring to an end the Parliamentary campaign for the re- 4
introduction of the birch.
Although he had won the Parliamentary battle, it was to be another six months 
before Butler was to finally gain the ascendancy over the party membership.
■Butler’s success at the 1961 Conservative conference has traditionally been f
attributed to the excellent speech that he had made in reply to the law and order 
debate, which routed the floggers.*'^ After the speech one Cabinet minister, fy
lain Macleod, with tears in his eyes, approached Butler’s wife Mollie to ask her
to ‘Tell Rab I have never heard him make a better speech’.**^  Faced with ï4
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debates, by hostile speakers from within the Conservative party who wanted to 
see a crackdown on crime that included bringing back the birch. This was not 
only damaging to Butler, but was also harming the party’s image and giving 
ammunition to their opponents. With national newspapers writing about ‘the 
blood thirsty woman Tory’,”  ^ and with the issue annually coming before the 
conference, the party managers decided to take action.
RAB HlO/11-13, Letters fi‘om Butler to W. Compton Carr MP, Peter Rawiinson, QC, MP,
RAB H16-17, ‘Resolutions Passed at the Annual Conference, Brighton’ 29 November 1961.
-i:
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As The Times noted, Butler had become the focal point of the floggers’ 
discontent as ‘His champions, as much as his opponents, speak of his profound 
reforming influence at the Home Office’.” '^  In other words, by playing up to 
his image as a reformer Butler was not just taking the sole credit for the 
progress he was making at the Home Office, but was also acting as a shield for 
his Cabinet colleagues on corporal punishment. Butler therefore stressed In his 
speech that it was not just his policy, but the policy of the government as a 
whole, to oppose the re-introduction of corporal punishment; an argument that A'
was highlighted by the range of Cabinet ministers lined up on the conference A
platform to listen to, and support, Butler’s speech.'*^ In addition, the
■traditional format of the conference debate was changed, which allowed a ;4moderate amendment to be proposed by a young Geoffrey Howe, whilst Butler 
lined up speakers to support the government lineJ^ Butler did well, with the 
respected penal campaigner Lady Elliot of Harwood (widow of former Tory 
Cabinet minister Walter Elliot) and aspiring MPs Peter Rawiinson Q.C. and 
John Hobson Q.C. all speaking in support of Butler.*'^ Despite fears that the 
vote would still be lost, Butler won the day with a large majority of 
constituency representatives backing the moderate amendment.’*®
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The ‘battle of the birch’ was a very public clash between Butler and those 
members of his party that supported corporal punishment and reflected two 
completely different approaches to law and order. Butler, as he made clear in 
Penal Practice in a Changing Society and his Criminal Justice Bill, sought to 
implement modern methods to punish and rehabilitate young criminals. C
However, this approach was anathema to many in the Conservative party who
.‘■'1felt that Butler was putting the interests of offenders ahead of his responsibility yto the victims of crime. Those in favour of corporal punishment rejected the
'Ievidence of two reports that found it had no deterrent value, and instead argued
4-that to ‘whack the thugs’ would deter young criminals and give some j;|
satisfaction to their victims. Butler’s rejection of these arguments again seems 
to play into the idea of him as the liberal reforming Home Secretary.
:
However, Butler made only modest claims about the scope of the measures he 
was proposing and in many ways was merely implementing those reforms 
included in the 1948 Criminal Justice Act that were still to be introduced.
Indeed, Butler argued that, like Sir Samuel Hoare in the 1930s and Ede in the 
1940s, all he was doing was playing his part in the continual process of reform, 
which would, in turn, be carried on by one of his successors.”  ^ Moreover, ::Butler maintained that he was not softening the system, but rather introducing y
the principle of the ‘short, sharp shock’; with discipline and training the ethos 
behind the new institutions being built to accommodate young offenders. And 
while Butler opposed the return of judicial corporal punishment, he did nothing 
to reduce its scope; retaining it as a punishment against extreme breaches of 
prison discipline, and, with the rest of the government, supporting the right of 
parents and teachers to discipline the children in their care by slapping or
Little evidence in the National Archives sheds any new light on a debate that 
was largely conducted in public, but merely confirms that Butler had the I
-------------------------------------------- Î
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Cabinet’s support botb in his approach to youth crime and also in his 
opposition to the re-introduction of corporal punisliment.’^’ However, amongst 
Butler’s Papers at Cambridge seemingly overlooked documents confirm his 
fixing of the law and order debate at the 1961 party conference and the lining 
up of speakers to support the government.
Although the issue rumbled on into future conferences, it was not to reach the |
same prominence that it had during Butler’s Home Secretaryship; but his
'victory had come at the price of further damaging his reputation amongst the 
right-wing of the party. However, whilst the debate over corporal punishment 
had polarised feelings within the Conservative party, it was nothing compared 
to the effect that the campaign to end the death penalty was having on British 
politics.
I
Î
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Chapter 3 - Capital Punishment
Kevin Jeffireys, ‘Ede, James Chuter Chuter-, Baron Chuter-Ede (1882-1965)’ Oxford 
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Butler became Home Secretary at an important stage o f the abolitionist 
campaign against the death penalty and found himself caught in the middle of a 
debate that cut across party boundaries. On his appointment Butler inherited 
the Homicide Bill which was to dramatically reduce the scope of the death 
penalty; restricting it to those types of murder where capital punishment was 
felt to be a unique deterrent. However, the Bill pleased neither the retentionists 
nor the abolitionists and, as a result, the issue continued to rumble on 
throughout Butler’s Home Secretaryship.
Î
In 1948 the Labour government had been forced to establish a Royal 
Commission on the death penalty as a result o f abolitionist pressure. The
House of Commons had voted in favour of an amendment to the Criminal :
Justice Bill that would suspend capital punishment for a five year trial period.
However, the Lords rejected suspension and so, in order to save the Bill, the 
abolitionists withdrew the amendment in return for a government promise to 
establish a Royal C o mmi s s i o n . Ho we v e r ,  the remit of the Commission was 
to investigate the working of the death penalty and not to consider whether it 4
should be retained or abolished. It was five years before the Commission A4
reported and by 1956 still no action had been taken to implement its 4
recommendations. 4
This lack of government action prompted the Labour MP and veteran 
abolitionist campaigner Sydney Silverman to introduce a Bill to abolish capital 
punishment. However, before Silverman’s Bill received its Second Reading 
the government sponsored a debate inviting the Commons to vote in favour of 
retaining the death penalty; a vote the government lost, with the Commons
48
instead supporting abolition or s u s p e n s i o n / A s  a result, the government 
made Parliamentary time available for Silverman’s Bill, but the Lords again 
rejected abolition and defeated the Bill/^"^ Silverman wanted the government 
to demonstrate the supremacy of the Commons over the Lords by forcing the
Bill through using the Parliament Act;'^^ but, having no appetite for a fight -%with the Lords and with the membership of the Tory party overwhelmingly 
favouring retention, it was decided instead on a compromise Bill/^^ The 
Homicide Act, which was designed to maintain the death penalty for murders ; ]
where its deterrent value was believed to have the most effect, was making its 
way through the House o f Commons as Butler was appointed Home Secretary. I"i
The Homicide Act, just like the appointment of the Royal Commission eight 
years earlier, was a compromise measure. In 1956, as in 1948, the government I
wanted to retain the death penalty but had failed to carry the House of 
Commons in support o f this policy. To further complicate matters, on both 
occasions the House of Lords had rejected the Common’s attempts at abolition.
As the previous Labour government had already used the well practiced 
stalling tactic of appointing a Royal Commission, Eden’s administration was 
forced into legislation. However, the choice facing ministers was to force |
through abolition using the Parliament Act to bypass the Lords, despite public 
opinion and the vast majority of Tory activists being against abolition, or 
frustrating the will of the House of Commons by retaining the death penalty 
but reducing its scope. The government chose the latter option.
Many of the recommendations of the Royal Commission were included in the 
Homicide Act, such as those relating to diminished responsibility and suicide 
pacts. Moreover, the Bill reduced the scope of the death penalty by retaining 
only five classes of capital murder (such as murder in the course of theft and 
murder by shooting or causing explosion). In his memoirs, Butler described
I"ii.
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I'the Bill as ‘rather curious’ as it sought not to punish the types of murder
I
deemed to be the most wicked, but rather those where capital punishment was 
believed to have the greatest deterrent effect/^^ In reality, though, Butler had 
no choice other than to continue with the Bill as it had already made significant 
progress through the Commons. In addition, none o f Butler’s colleagues 
would have welcomed re-opening the controversy over capital punishment, 
and, in any event, Butler had no alternative proposals that would gain broader 
support than the Bill currently going through Parliament.
I
Butler’s less than enthusiastic support of the Homicide Act in his memoirs, |
together with his declaration that ‘By the end of my time at the Home Office I 
began to see that the system could no go on’’^  ^ has led to speculation as to his 
real opinion of capital punishment. Although Butler stoutly supported the 
government throughout the 1956 debates and saw the Homicide Act safely
: . .4onto the Statute Book, he has come to be seen as a reluctant hanger. Howard 
records that despite Butler’s defenee o f the government position the ‘suspicion, 
at least in liberal circles, was that Rab himself was a secret abolitionist’.
This view is shared by Dominic Sandbrook who wrote of Butler that ‘Although 
a private opponent of the death penalty, he had never fought hard for its 
r e p e a l H o w e v e r ,  the more accepted view is that Butler went to the Home 
Office a supporter of capital punishment, but his experiences of having to 
decide the fate of those convicted of capital murder, whether to reprieve or ^
allow the law to take its course, turned him into a convinced abolitionist. -it
As there is nothing in the Butler Papers to confirm Howard’s ‘secret J
abolitionist’ theory, and as Butler’s public statements had all supported the 
government’s line on capital punisliment, it is necessary to look to the National
:
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Archives to see if any evidence exists to prove whether Butler’s private view 
differed from his public statements. At the National Archives there is no single 
document that clarifies Butler’s personal position on capital punishment and, 
indeed, if any such document existed it would have to be treated with some 
caution. Therefore it is necessary to take the evidence that is available in the 
Archives, in addition to Butler’s public statements and private papers, and try 
to piece together the most likely explanation.
TNA: PREM 11/1747, 1956-57, undated handwritten note.
Firstly, there is nothing to suggest that Butler was an abolitionist at the time he 
was appointed to the Home Office. During the debate in February 1956,
Butler, as Leader of the House, spoke on behalf of the government and fconcluded his speech declaring that:
I am a Christian myself, and I believe in the retention of the death |
penalty. I say, at the same time, that my duty to society makes me say !
that under present cireumstances it would be unwise for this House . . . 
to abolish the penalty of death for murder.
i
Butler then supported the government in the Division Lobby. Three members 
of the Cabinet (Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd; Agriculture Minister, Derick 
Heathcoat Amory; and Minister of Labour, Iain Macleod) opposed capital 
punishment on principle and abstained from voting, even although the 
government went on to lose the Division. Later, when the government was 
preparing the Homicide Bill as an alternative to outright abolition there was 
some concern that Macleod and Heathcoat Amory would not accept this 
c o m p r o m i s e . I n  contrast Butler was willing to speak and vote against 
abolition and there is no similar concern as to whether he would accept a 
compromise Bill that retained the death penalty.
It may be argued, however, that Butler had no choice but to support retention.
As a senior member of the government, who deputised for the Prime Minister 4Vi
'■V
HC Debates, vol. 548, col. 2646, 16 February 1956.
Hi
in his absence, could Butler afford to indulge his conscience as Lloyd, 
Heathcoat Amory and Macleod had? The Chief Whip, Edward Heath, who as 
party leader supported permanent abolition in 1970, voted in support of the 
government in 1956. As Chief Whip, Heath was not in a position to do 
otherwise.’ "^^ Even although there was a free vote, it was a government Motion 
and the Chief Whip could not vote against the wishes of his front bench. 
Butler may have considered himself to have been in the same position.
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Yet, if  Butler did vote for retention out of loyalty, he showed no sign of 
reluctance when he participated in the debate. During his speech he reconciled 
capital punishment with his Christian faith, argued that he believed that his 
duty to soeiety demanded he vote for retention and even declared that ‘no i
innocent man has been hanged in recent m e m o r y T h e s e  are hardly the 
remarks of a man whose conscience was troubled by the continuance of the 
death penalty and would have demonstrated a cynicism unparalleled at any 
other stage of his career. The evidence points to the conclusion that Butler 
went to the Home Office a supporter of retaining capital punishment.
Did, then, Butler’s view on capital punishment change over the course of his 
Home Secretaryship? There are two incidents that may help provide an answer 
to this question. Firstly, during the passage of his Criminal Justice Bill in 1961 %
the abolitionists proposed an amendment to raise the minimum age at which a 
person could suffer the death penalty from 18 to 21 years. This had been
recommended by the Royal Commission, but the Commissioners had been split 
on the issue and had only agreed on the reeommendation by six votes to five.
Butler decided to refer the issue to the Cabinet, but in his memorandum he did 
not deal only with the proposed amendment to his Bill, but also asked the 
Cabinet to consider whether capital punishment should be retained. Butler
HC Debates, vol. 548, cols. 2646-56, 16 February 1956; and Edward Heath, The Course o f  f
My Life. The Autobiography o f  Edw ard Heath (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1988), p.
300.
HC Debates, vol. 548, col. 2643, 16 February 1956. -j
136 pp. qJ - R oyal  Commission on Capital Punishment, p. 275.
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argued that they had three options. The first was to restore eapital punishment 
for all types of murder, which would be supported by a large number of Tory 
MPs and the general public, but opposed by the Opposition and by a ‘strong 
minority’ of Conservative MPs. Secondly, there was abolition which 
commanded a majority in the House of Commons but ‘would certainly not f
■Acommend itself to the majority of our supporters, or, I think to public opinion’.
Butler’s recommendation, though, was ‘to play the matter long’ and continue
,
with the Homicide Act as it stood, while urging ministers to discourage debate |
lest it become an election i s s u e . T h e  memorandum sparked passionate 
debate within the Cabinet, reflecting the lack on consensus on the issue in 
Parliament and in the country. As the Cabinet could not agree on any 
alternative course of action, it accepted the Home Secretary’s recommendation
:'z
to do nothing. As for the amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill ‘They agreed 
that, in view of the prevalence o f crimes of violence by young people, this 
amendment should be resi st ed’. |
It is clear that Butler was in a difficult position over capital punishment. The 
Cabinet was divided, the Commons supported abolition but the Lords did not, 
whilst many Tory party members wanted restoration for all types of murder.
Full restoration was not possible as the Commons would not support it and 
using the Parliament Act to force through abolition would cause uproar in the 
Conservative party. Therefore, Butler had no option but to recommend to his 't'colleagues ‘to play the matter long’. Yet this does not mean that Butler was ' i..
unhappy with the status quo. Certainly the tone of his memorandum 
demonstrates weariness with the issue, which continued to take up much of his 
time and put him in an awkward position in Parliament, but Butler does not 
admit to any change of heart. All Butler was seeking was for his colleagues to 
support the line he was taking on the general issue of capital punishment and 
Specifically the amendment attached to his Criminal Justice Bill, and in this he A
was suecessful.
TNA: CAB 129/104, C (61) 20, Capital Punishment -  Memorandum by the Secretary o f  
State for the Home Department, 8 Februaiy 1961.
TNA: CAB 128/35, CC (61) 6‘'’ Conclusions, Minute 3, 13 February 1961.
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On the amendment to the Bill, the Cabinet agreed with Butler that the proposal 
to raise the minimum age should be r e j e c t e d / A  Home Office file set out the 
reasons. Firstly, it was argued that in considering whether to exercise the 
Prerogative of Mercy the youthfulness of the offender was taken into 
eonsideration. Since the Homicide Act had come into force four people under 
the age of 21 had been convicted of capital murder -  two had been reprieved 
and two executed, with the Home Secretary taking all factors into account, not |
just the age of the offenders. Moreover, it was feared that increasing the age 
might lead to an increase in the number of young people using firearms. As the 
very nature of a deterrent made it impossible to Icnow how many young people 
had been put off using guns by the existence of the death penalty for murder 
committed using firearms, there was no way of measuring the effectiveness o f 
the deterrent effect of the Homicide Act, but it was believed that a rise in gun 
crime amongst young people was being prevented. Finally, the views of the 
electorate had to be taken into account and it would be wrong to raise the age 
limit as ‘such action would inevitably be regarded by public opinion as both
dangerous and i n o p p o r t u n e /
'■:|v,.v
The second incident that may help answer the question as to whether Butler 
came to support abolition during his Home Secretaryship came a little over a 
week before Butler left the Home Office. On 5 July 1962 Butler and
4:Macmillan met a deputation from the National Campaign for the Abolition of 
Capital Punishment. In advance of the meeting Macmillan had requested a 
briefing from the Home Office. In a covering note from the Cabinet Secretary,
Norman Brook, it was admitted that ‘there is growing recognition that the 
Homicide Act of 1957 was a mistake, though this cannot be said publicly until 
the government is prepared to propose an alternative’, but Brook went on to
TNA: CAB 129/104, C (61) 20, Capital Punishment -  Memorandum by the Secretary o f  
State for the Home Department, 8 February 1961.
HO 3^  29/297, Children’s Division, Capital and Corporal Punishment 1961.
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stress that the Home Secretary did not feel that the time had come for the death 
penalty to be abolished/ M
As has been seen, despite his eonsistent public support for the retention of 
capital punishment, the impression held by some was that Butler was a secret |
abolitionist. No such confusion surrounded the position of Harold Macmillan.
During the debates in 1956, Macmillan recorded his support of retention in 
both his diary and the Division L o b b y . I n  addition, whilst there was concern 
as to whether Heathcoat Amory and Macleod would accept a compromise that 
retained the death penalty, Macmillan was urging that as few concessions as 
possible should be made to the abolitionists.
Ï:The delegation from the National Campaign for the Abolition of Capital 
Punishment could therefore have had little hope of convincing either the Prime AMinister or Home Secretary of the case for abolition. As the minute of the 
meeting demonstrates, Butler stuck to the line that:
. . .  we should not be too ready to jump to the eonclusion that Capital |
Punishment was no longer a deterrent. He was advised by very liberal 
advisers that there was still a degree of deterrent present and in the 
present state of crime he would be sorry to see that deterrent removed. |
He had a full knowledge of the inequalities of the present Aet, but he 
thought it would be unwise to change the law at the present time. He 
thought that the trend was undoubtedly towards abolition but that the
time for it had not yet come.'" '^  ^ 7'I
i
Even although Butler was prepared to admit the short comings of the Homicide 
Act, he still maintained that there was a deterrent factor, which was confirmed 
by his ‘very liberal advisers’. Furthermore, while Butler was willing to
%
--------------------------------------------
TNA: PREM 1 1/3686, Briefing Note on Capital Punishment, 3 July 1962.
Peter Catterall, The Macmillan Diaries: The Cabinet Years, 1950-1957  (London: Pan 
Books, 2004), pp 542, 560, 572, 576-7.
TNA: CAB 21/4682, Macmillan to Sir Anthony Eden, 23 July 1956.
TNA: PREM 1 1/3686, Meeting with deputation from National Campaign for the Abolition 
o f Capital Punishment, 5 July 1962.
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concede that ‘the trend was undoubtedly towards abolition’, he neither 
welcomed nor condemned this trend and was not yet convinced that it was time 
for abolition.
Yet, as Butler was still maintaining the deterrent value of capital punishment,
Macmillan was declaring that ‘Abolition was a question o f timing and method’ 
and was therefore inevitable. ‘O f course the law must not move too far ahead 
of public opinion’, continued Macmillan, ‘but it was sufficient if a change in 
the law were acceptable to public opinion; it was not necessary for the change 
to be demanded by public opinion’. A  cynic might conclude that the Prime 
Minister was seeking to wrong foot a colleague with whom he had a strained 
relationship and at the same time appear more liberal than his Home Secretary.
Whatever Macmillan’s motive, abolition would not come as easily as he was 
suggesting. The Cabinet was just as divided over the issue as it had been a 
year earlier and a majority of the party would still oppose abolition no matter 
the state of public opinion generally. Moreover, the problem of getting a Bill 
through the House of Lords remained.
The evidence therefore suggests that right until the end of his Home
'Secretaryship Butler continued to support retention of capital punishment. At :Â|no point, in public or in private, did Butler indicate that he was opposed on |
principle, but in fact reconciled his Chiistian faith with the death penalty. In 
addition, during the Cabinet debate in February 1961 and at the meeting with 
the abolitionist campaigners just a week before he left the Home Office, Butler
view of him as a leading member of the liberal wing o f the Conservative party.
"I
was still arguing that capital punishment had a unique deterrent value, despite 
the anomalies of the Homicide Act. "4:
;
Given Butler’s progressive approach to penal reform, taken together with the |
Ï
:it is understandable that sympathetic writers would accept the view of Butler
ITNA: PREM 11/3686, Meeting with deputation from National Campaign for the Abolition 
o f Capital Punishment, 5 July 1962,
■ ...'A •:
,A,either as a secret abolitionist or of coming to support abolition as a result of his 
experiences at the Home Office. However, it is too simplistic to argue that all 
those on the left should have been abolitionists and all those on the right
■¥retentionists. Capital punishment cut across party factions. Some members of 
the liberal One Nation group within the Conservative party, such as Reggie 
Maudling were supporters of the death penalty, whilst the leading member of %
the right-wing Suez Group Julian Amory was in favour of abolition.
Indeed, rather than contradicting his progressive views on penal matters, Butler A
saw the death penalty as having its place in a reformed system. The whole 
thrust of Butler’s penal policy was prevention and cutting recidivism, however 
for some crimes Butler believed the gallows the best deterrent.
approved by Butler, stated that the Home Secretary was:
Î
One of the Home Secretary’s duties was to review every death sentence and 
decide whether to recommend to the Crown that the Prerogative of Mercy be 
exercised and the convicted person reprieved, or whether the law should take ÿ
its course and the execution go ahead. Butler described this as a ‘hideous À
responsibility’.’"^  ^ Further pressure was placed on Butler as no executions had 
taken place during 1956 as all death sentences had been commuted while 
Parliament debated the issue. With the passing of the Homicide Act, the Home 
Secretary would again have to decide the fate of those condemned.
Indeed, in April 1957 the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Goddard, wrote to Sir Frank 
Newsam to confirm that with the advent of the Homicide Act commutations of 
death sentences would no longer be automatic. Goddard wished this 
clarification as ‘I am sure you understand the Judges object to passing the 
death sentence if it is never to be carried out’ Newsam’s reply, which was
anxious to avoid any impression that reprieves will in any sense be vt
automatic, and he has authorised me to say that, in his view, in cases of
A4
Reginald Maudling, Memoirs (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1978), p. 161. Also HC  
Debates, vol. 548, cols. 2646-2656, 16 February 1956.
Butler, Memoirs, p. 201.
TNA: HO 291/154, Letter from Lord Goddard to Sir Frank Newsam, 26 April 1957.
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capital murder under the new Act the law should be able to take its 
course, save where there are strong mitigating circumstances/"’^
Î
This responsibility over reprieves led Butler to shut himself away for days at a 
time when considering a case and taking counsel from the judiciary or the Lord 
Chancellor as he felt necessary/^’’ The decision was his alone to make and 
Butler quickly found that he was in a no-win situation as the reason behind the 
Home Secretary’s decision was never made publie/^’ Butler would then find 
himself under attack without being able to explain his decision, by abolitionists 
if he allowed the execution to go ahead, or if he commuted the sentence by 1
those who believed the execution should have taken place. 1Howard, having floated the idea that Butler was secretly an abolitionists, then 
seems to accept the claim made by the right-wing journalist and author 
Auberon Waugh that Butler was ‘responsible for sending more condemned 
prisoners to the gallows than any other post-war Home S e c r e t a r y B u t l e r ’s
agreement to the toughly worded reply to Lord Goddard may seem to bear this 
out. Yet the purpose of the Homicide Act was to significantly reduce the 
number of executions each year, whilst retaining the death penalty where it was 
folt to be an effective deterrent. Looking at the post-war Home Secretaries it 
can be seen that the number of cases that came for Butler’s consideration was :'4;
substantially less that his predeeessors. In six years at the Home Office 
between 1945 and 1951 Chuter Ede allowed 98 executions to go ahead; as 
Home Secretary for four years between 1951 and 1954 Maxwell-Fyfo 
sanctioned 52 executions; whilst in his four and a half years Butler allowed the 
law to take its course 23 times. Between September 1945 and the start of 1956 
(when commutations became automatic due to the Parliamentary debates) an 
average of 16 executions took place in England and Wales each year. In
Î
TNA: HO 291/154, Letter from Newsam to Goddard, 29 April 1957.
Howard, RAB, pp. 253-4.
' PP: Report o f  the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, pp. 210-11.
Howard, RAB, p. 253. Waugh made the claim in the Sunday Telegraph on 12 April 1981.
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Richard Clark, English and Welsh Executions 1932-1964, Capital Punishment UK website, 
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contrast, in the eight years that the Homicide Act was in operation that average 
fell to four executions a year.’^^
Also implicit in Waugh’s claim is the accusation that Butler was less willing to
grant reprieves than his predecessors. However, the Home Secretary had very
little impact on the quasi-judicial system that had grown round the granting of
reprieves. Indeed, the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment found that:
. . .  a body of precedent has built up in the Home Office and Scottish 
Home Department, which serves as a guide to successive Secretaries of 
State, confining the exercise of individual judgement to a small number 
of borderline eases, providing a safeguard against decisions that might 
seem capricious or arbitrary.’ "^’
This system of precedents would need to be adapted to the new circumstances 
created by the Homicide Act, but there is no evidence that the basis for the 
granting of reprieves became stricter during Butler’s Home Secretaryship. The 
Royal Commission found that from 1900 to 1950 about 45 per cent of those 
sentenced to death had their sentence c o m m u t e d . F o r  the total duration of 
the 1957 Act, 48 people were sentenced to death, of which 19 were 
r e p r i e v e d . T h e r e f o r e ,  just fewer than 40 per cent had their sentences 
commuted, a figure that fits well within the decade by decade fluctuations 
noted by the Royal Commission. It can be seen, then, that Butler was neither 
the most prolific hanger amongst the post-war Home Secretaries as Waugh 
claimed, or that he was particularly strict in his granting of reprieves as was 
implied. Instead Butler followed the same body of precedent, with only a few 
cases remaining that were up to the Home Secretary to decide.
Even so, those sympathetic to Butler have questioned his judgement in 
allowing the executions of Gunther Padola, George Riley and Ronald
I
Ï
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'
Marwood/^^ However, perhaps the most controversial execution that Butler 
sanctioned was that of James Hamatty.*^^ Hanratty was executed at Bedford
Prison in April 1962 having been convicted of the ‘A6 Murder’, despite 
maintaining that he had been in Wales at the time. Such was the subsequent 
controversy over the case that Hanratty’s parents attempted to sue Butler after 
he had left public life, claiming that Butler had been negligent in his failure to 
recommend mercy. The action was dismissed by the High C o u r t , a n d  in July 
2002, forty years after Hanratty’s execution and twenty years after Butler’s 
death, DNA testing proved ‘beyond doubt’ that Hanratty had been guilty of the 
murder
I
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Many years of making these decisions, some writers argue, turned Butler into 
an abolitionist, and this has even been argued by the most determined protector S
of Butler’s reputation, his wife Mollie.’^^  However, as has been seen, Butler 
argued right to the end of his Home Secretaryship for the retention of the death ;
penalty. Butler did once raise the issue of his responsibility over reprieves in
:Z;Cabinet. In his memorandum of February 1961, Butler stated that there had 
been a number of criticisms over some cases where he had allowed the law to '.7take its course. ‘I must therefore expect increasing criticism of my decisions in 
individual cases, and increasing Parliamentary pressure for debates about A
them.’’^  ^ It was customary for the Home Secretary’s decisions on reprieves |
not to be made public, but given the increased activity of abolitionists like 
Silverman, a Parliamentary debate may have been forced upon Butler. If a 
debate was forced then Butler would ‘only maintain, as my predecessors . . . j
that I take account of all the circumstances of each case, and all the information
Pearce, Lost Leaders, p. 100-1. /
Gilmour and Garnett, The Tories, p. 162.
'^ 0 TNA: TS 58/1070, Attempt by Mr and Mrs James Hanratty to serve a writ on Lord Butler, -4
1970-1.
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available to me . . . before coming to what I believe to be the right decision.’’ "^’ 
Again Butler was demonstrating that he took this quasi-judicial responsibility 
seriously and would only grant reprieves where he felt it the appropriate course 
of action.
The final element of Butler’s dealings with the death penalty came in the shape 
of the campaign to clear the name of Timothy Evans. Butler’s declaration 
during the February 1956 debate that no innocent man had been executed in 
recent times was controversial because of the Evans case. Evans had been 
executed in 1950 for the murder of his daughter, but it was discovered three 
years later that another man, John Christie, who lodged at the same house as 
Evans, was a mass murderer. An inquiry held shortly after the discovery of 
Christie, found that Evans had been correctly convicted and that two murderers 
had been living at 10 Rillington Place.
As the abolition movement gained momentum the Evans case was often used
to illustrate the case against capital punishment. Gradually a campaign
developed for a new inquiry, for Evans to be granted a posthumous free pardon
and for his remains to be exhumed from its prison grave and returned to his
mother for Christian burial. The situation surrounding Evans was the final
point discussed by the Cabinet during their debate on capital punishment in
February 1961. In his memorandum, Butler stated that:
. . . my conclusion is likely to be that, whether Evans was guilty or not, 
it cannot now be established that he was innocent o f  the murder o f  the 
child. If so, there could be no question of giving him a Free Pardon; 
and, I suggest, no point in having a further inquiry. The evidence in the 
case, so far as witnesses survive, is now not only old, but probably 
influenced by the arguments which have been going on over the last 12 
years.
When the matter was discussed by the Cabinet, the Colonial Secretary, Iain 
Macleod, took issue with Butler. Macleod (who, as his biographer points out,
164 129/104, C(61)20, 8 February 1961, Capital Punishment -  Memorandum by
the Secretary o f  State for the Home Department.
CAB 129/104, C (6I)20, 8”' February 1961, Capital Punishment -  Memorandum by 
the Secretary o f  State for the Home Department. Italics are Butler’s.
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As he was seeking to reduce the opportunities for debate on the issue o f capital
HC Debates, vol. 649, cols. 702-711 ,15  June 1961. Quote col. 711.
1
:S
is named in the usually anonymous Cabinet minute ) argued that it was 
probable that Evans would not have been charged with the murder of his child.
Butler, however, remained unmoved and was supported on the issue by the rest
of the C a b i n e t . I
The debate over Evans then moved from the Cabinet to Parliament where the I
Timothy John Evans Bill was introduced by the Labour MP Charles Pannell. 
Pannell was seeking to have Evans’ remains returned to his family for burial.
Significantly, one o f the sponsors of the Bill was Chuter Ede, who as Home 
Secretary had sanctioned Evans’ e x e c u t i o n . A f t e r  the failure of the Bill, the If
Opposition sponsored a debate on the Evans case in June 1961. Again Ede, 
who declared that he would have commuted the death sentence if he had 
known at the time about Christie, argued passionately for another investigation 
to be instituted to examine the circumstances surrounding Evans conviction.
Butler replied that he could not agree to establish another inquiry as he did not 
believe it would resolve the issue. Moreover, Butler argued that he could not 
grant a posthumous free pardon because there was no precedent for it, he 
doubted if he had the legal powers to do so and that, although reprieves were 
granted if there was any doubt of guilt, a pardon could only be given if there 
was certainty of innocence, and given the nature of the case this certainty could
■:lnot exist. Finally on the issue of removing Evans’ remains from the prison 
cemetery and restored to his family, Butler stated that he did not have the legal 
power to authorise this and that legislation would therefore be required.
However, while there was still doubt as to Evans’ innocence, Butler could not "A
give the government’s support for such legislation.’ ’^’
1
punisliment it is understandable that Butler would not agree to another inquiry.
Shepherd, M acleod, p. 487.
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Once established Butler would have no control over it, and, as he argued in the 
Commons, there was no certainty that an inquiry would be able to produce a 
definitive answer on Evans’ guilt or innocence, which would merely drag the 
issue on indefinitely. Furthermore, whilst Butler’s argument about the lack of 
precedence over the granting of posthumous free pardons may seem like a 
stalling tactic, as has been seen, precedence played a critical role in the 
administration of the death sentence. It is upon this that the decisions over 
reprieves rested and to diminish the importance of precedence could have 
wider consequences in relation to the exercise of the Prerogative of Mercy. 
Butler’s appeal that the tradition of his office precluded him from taking action 
may seem weak, but given its importance to his whole approach when deciding 
the fate of those sentenced to death his reliance on this argument becomes 
more understandable.
4
...-r
iWith Butler’s progressive reputation on penal reform it is understandable that the idea that he had abolitionist tendencies would gain currency. Yet capital 
punishment cut across party faction and it is too simplistic to argue that Butler 
should automatically have been an abolitionist. No evidence exists to support
the suggestion that Butler was either a secret abolitionist at the time he went to 
the Home Office or that he came to favour abolition as a result of his 
experience over reprieves. Indeed, as the files at the National Archives 
demonstrate, Butler argued to the very end of his Home Secretaryship for the 
retention of the death penalty, even although he was coming to see the 
anomalies created by the Homicide Act. Instead, the most likely explanation is 
that Butler, like his predecessors Samuel Hoare, Herbert Monison and Chuter 
Ede, came to support abolition after he had left the Home Office. Just weeks 
before the Conservative party lost the 1964 general election, Butler’s successor 
as Home Secretary, Henry Brooke, wi'ote to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, who was 
now Prime Minister, that ‘The Homicide Act is unworkable in its present form
■A
:|
I
63
and the next Home Secretary, of whatever party, will have to end the death 
penalty’ If Butler had come to the same conclusion he kept it to himself.
Compared to his predecessors Butler did have significantly fewer capital 
sentences to consider due to the advent of the Homicide Act. Waugh’s 
portrayal of ‘Bloody Butler’ who sent more men to the gallows than any other 
post-war Secretary of State does not stand up to scrutiny. In fact, Butler 
sanctioned considerably fewer executions than many of his predecessors, and 
the average rate of reprieves was consistent with the figures for grants of mercy 
before the Homicide Act. What does become clear, though, is the importance 
of precedence in the operation of the death penalty, and a clinging to this 
crutch may go some way to explain Butler’s reluctance to give in to the 
pressure surrounding the Evans case. In 1966 it cost Roy Jenkins nothing 
when he granted Evans a Free Pardon at a time when capital punishment was 
suspended and Jenldns had no responsibility over reprieves; but for Butler the 
importance of tradition and precedence cannot be over-estimated when making 
the terrible decision to send someone to the gallows.
TNA: PREM 11/4690, Minute from Henry Brooke to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 22
September 1964.
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Part 2 -  Social Policy
I
Chapter 4 -  Gambling, Licensing and Sunday 
Observance Law Reform
■Ù-
In addition to law and order, the Home Secretary also had responsibility for 
many social issues. The Wolfenden Committee’s report on prostitution and 
homosexuality; possible restrictions to immigration from within the f
Commonwealth; and reforms to the laws on gambling, licensing and Sunday |
observance were all to be tackled by Butler. Butler was to develop a reputation 
as a progressive and liberal reformer on social issues, just as he had with issues |
of law and order. However just as Butler’s approach to penal reform was iï
■4:loudly applauded but little studied, so to was his work on social reform - ."'gespecially on his betting and licensing legislation.
■4a
Reform of the betting and gaming laws had been discussed within government 
for some years before Butler was appointed to the Home Office. In March 
1951 the Royal Commission on Betting, Lotteries and Gaming published its 
report in which it recommended significant changes to the law. The 
Commission found that the existing law was ‘obscure, illogical and difficult to 'N
enforce’, with some of the legislation dating as far back as the sixteenth 
century and therefore no longer suitable for modern conditions. A number 4
of reforms were recommended covering issues as diverse as off-the-course A
betting; lotteries and competitions; gaming; and slot machines. ■
■IAHowever, having received the Royal Commission’s report, the government i
seemed in no hurry to implement its recommendations. In 1953 Winston t''Churchill asked Christopher Soames, his son-in-law and Parliamentary Private 
Secretary, to look at the report. Soames concluded that the recommendation to
TNA: PREM 11/4690, Minute from Christopher Soames to Winston Churchill, 18
November 1953.
TNA: PREM 11/4690, Minute from P. R. Pittam to the Home Office, 14 December 1955. 
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o f State for the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal, 25 July 1957.
TNA: CAB 129/88, C (57) 179, Betting and Gaming Bill -  Memorandum by the Secretary 
o f  State for the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal, 25 July 1957.
TNA: CAB 128/31, CC (57) 71" Conclusions, Minute 5, 7 October 1957.
65
allow the setting up of betting shops was likely to prove the most controversial 
provision of the report, but expressed himself ‘glad the problem is to be 
tackled’. Y e t  no action was taken during Churchill’s premiership and the 
issue was left to his successor, Anthony Eden, who informed the Home Office 
that he would like to see the matter brought before the Cabinet.’^ "’ By March 
1956 the House of Commons was informed that legislation was being drawn 
up to bring in the reforms recommended by the Royal Commission.
This was the situation when Butler was appointed to the Home Office. Butler 
recognised that there would be serious consequences to not taking action; as 
the enforcement of the law was becoming increasingly ineffective and there 
was a risk of police officers being corrupted by bookmakers bribing them to 
turn a blind eye to illegal betting. In addition, the existing law was out of step 
with public opinion, especially as it appeared that the law discriminated in 
favour of the rich and against the less well off. Despite this Butler advised his 
colleagues that the best policy would be to postpone introducing legislation.
Having taken soundings of backbench Tory MPs, he had found no enthusiasm 
for tackling this issue as many believed there would be a determined campaign 
from the churches, bookmakers and racing interests against any proposed 
liberalisation of the law. Moreover, Butler believed that any Bill would 
contain ‘numerous controversial features’ and would be ‘complicated, 
protracted and unrewarding’.’ ’^’ The Cabinet agreed as it was felt that ‘the 
balance of advantage appeared to lie in not promoting a measure on so 
contentious a subject’.’^^  Again the aftermath of Suez and the prospect o f a ,clgeneral election ensured that there was no appetite for introducing potentially 
controversial legislation.
Jarvis, Conservatives and M orality, p. 68.
TNA: Home Office: Liquor Fites: HO 295/1: Crossbow, ‘Politics, Morals and Society’,
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Yet before the end of the Parliament Butler’s attitude to betting and gambling 
reform had undergone a complete transformation. Recent new research has 
shown that, just as the article by C. H. Rolph in the New Statesman had acted 
as a catalyst to penal reform, another journal article was to have the same effect 
on Butler in the area of social r e f o r m . T h e  Bow Group was a recently 
formed think-tank of young and ambitious graduates within the Conservative 
party, which sought to influence policy and publish contributions from I
members in the group’s journal Crossbow, The New Year 1959 edition of 
Crossbow concentrated on ‘Politics, Morals and Society’ in which a series of 
articles argued for a more liberal approach to various social issues.
A look at the National Archives shows the impact that the articles had on
Butler. As with the Rolph article, after reading Crossbow Butler asked for the 
issues raised to be examined by senior officials. However, it was not all the 
issues raised in the journal that interested Butler, but rather those included in 
the article by Chiistopher Johnson on betting and gaming, licensing and 
Sunday observance restrictions.’ ®^ This excluded a number of issues, including 
policy on prostitution and homosexual law reform, on which Butler had already f
made up his mind.
Nevertheless, Butler considered the CrossboM> articles a ‘valuable stimulant’.
As a result of ‘the prodding we have had from Crossbow' he made it clear, 
when wiiting to Sir Charles Cunningham, that he was already minded to carry 
out some measure of reform and that ‘There is no doubt that much of our 
legislation in the fields mentioned . . . dates from an age which is now past, and 
we should prepare our pigeon-holes for some, at any rate, o f the pigeons to fly 
out’.’^’ Responding to the Home Secretary’s letter, Cunningham agreed that
January 1959.
TNA: H 0295/1 , minute from Butler to Cunningham, 16 January 1959. 
TNA: H 0295/1 , minute from Butler to Cunningham, 16 January 1959.
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action on betting legislation would be desirable as ‘it is quite wrong that the If
182 /I
i
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existing law should be so totally inconsistent with practice’.
policy was to ‘Do nothing about Black. Let us cany on’.’^^
There would be no opportunity for Butler to implement any reforms before 
Parliament was dissolved for the general election, and so he therefore sought to 
have a firm commitment to legislating on these issues included in the party’s 
election manifesto, which he achieved despite the reluctance of Macmillan. In 
his memoirs Butler recorded that he proposed the unexceptional language for
Athe manifesto that: ‘We shall revise some of our social laws, for example those
..relating to betting and gaming and to clubs and licensing, which are at present |
full of anomalies and lead to abuse and even corruption’. As unexceptional as 
the wording may have been, Macmillan was unenthusiastic and declared that A
‘We already have the Toby Belch vote. We must not antagonize the Malvolio |
vote’. With the intervention of the Chief Whip in support of Butler, Macmillan 
resignedly gave way. ’
Macmillan’s lack of enthusiasm may have been confirmed by a letter received 
from the backbench Tory MP Sir Cyril Black. Black, a prominent member of 
the temperance movement and who believed gambling to be immoral, wrote to 
Macmillan to express his concern at the rumours circulating that the election 
manifesto would contain provisions for betting, licensing and Sunday 
obseiwance legislation.’ "^’ The Prime Minister passed Black’s letter to the 
Home Office for a response, but Butler was unmoved and decided the best
The effect of Butler’s new commitment to reform of the gambling law was for 
work to begin on a Bill to give effect to the Royal Commission’s proposals, for 
introduction immediately after the general election. Still the Prime Minister 
remained unconvinced of the desirability of such a Bill, and, there is some
TNA: H 0295/1 , minute from Cunningham to Butler, 19 January 1959. 
Butler, Memoirs, pp. 197-8.
TNA: H 0295/1 , letter from Sir Cyril Black to Macmillan, 2 July 1959. 
TNA: H 0295/1 , draft correspondence from Butler, 7 July 1959.
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evidence to suggest that he made a last minute attempt to have the Bill 
scrapped. Immediately after the election, Macmillan requested details of what 
was being proposed as he ‘wondered whether it would be setting up 
Government-owned or Government-run betting shops with E.R. over the 
door’,’ ®^ and Macmillan decided that the matter had to come to the Cabinet 
again for ‘ a frank discussion’. ’
If the Prime Minister hoped that the Cabinet would oppose the Bill he was to 
be disappointed. Interestingly, the Cabinet minute shows no sign of the Prime 
Minister’s concerns, as, summing up the discussion, he concluded that ‘it 
would be preferable to make the Bill as liberal as possible and to insert more 
restrictive provisions than to introduce it in a more restrictive form and be 
forced to make concessions’.’^^  However, following the Cabinet’s approval of 
the proposed Bill the Prime Minister’s Private Secretary, Tim Bligh, was able 
to inform the Cabinet Office that ‘there was no need to alter The Queen’s 
Speech’.’ ®^ This seems to imply that, despite his supportive comments in 
Cabinet and the commitment made in the party’s election manifesto, the Prime 
Minister believed it was still possible, and even desirable, for the Bill to be 
dropped.
The main features of the Betting and Gaming Bill were to legalise off-the- 
course betting on horse-racing through the introduction of betting shops. In 
addition many of the extensive restrictions on gaming were to be swept away. 
It quickly became clear that tliree issues were going to dominate the passage of 
the Bill; the regulations on the running of betting shops; the status of street 
betting; and the possibility of forcing bookmakers to give a financial 
contribution to horse-racing.
;
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MPs of all parties were concerned about the conditions of betting shops. The 
Bill attempted to ensure that no loitering would be permitted either inside or 
outside betting shops (in order to try and prevent continuous betting), by not 
permitting any seating, televisions or radios on the premises.’®® In Butler’s 
words ‘the House of Commons was so intent on making “betting shops” as sad 
as possible, in order not to deprave the young, that they ended up more like f
undertakers’ premises’.’®’ The general attitude of MPs was that whilst the law 
should be liberalised to allow people to bet if they wished, nothing should be 
done that would actually encourage betting.
On the issue of street betting and of a possible levy on bookmakers to support 
the horse-racing industry, MPs split roughly along party lines. During the 
Report Stage of the Bill, Chuter Ede, the former Labour Home Secretary, 
proposed an amendment that would legalise street betting in England and 
Wales. Despite its illegality, Ede argued that street betting was popular 
whereas betting shops would not be. He therefore believed that it was pointless 
to introduce stiffer penalties to discourage street betting whilst introducing 
betting shops which would be unpopular. Moreover, Ede argued that the 
existence of betting shops would promote betting; for example that more 
woman would be encouraged to place a bet when doing their shopping, 1
whereas street bookmakers were unobtrusive and would not have the same
Butler firmly rejected the amendment and argued that, whether it was popular 
or not, the street was no proper place for betting to take place. Furthermore, 
street bookmakers were unobtrusive because they were breaking the law, but if 
their activities were legalised there would be no reason for them to maintain 
their low profile. This would allow them to solicit for business and would 
make it more difficult to stop young people from betting.’®^ With the
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government imposing a three line whip and the Opposition allowing a free 
vote, Ede’s amendment was decisively defeated.
Tory MPs, however, were mainly concerned with the issue of whether to 
introduce a levy on bookmakers to support the horse-racing industry; an issue i
which had not been considered by the Royal Commission. Indeed there is 
some evidence to suggest that this was one of the factors that convinced Butler 
not to legislate on betting in 1957. From the debates over the Bill it becomes 
clear that in many cases ‘horse-racing interests’ and the Parliamentary 
Conservative party were one and the same. In April 1957, before he had 
persuaded the Cabinet to indefinitely postpone the introduction of a betting
■ I.Bill, Butler had brought the issue to the Home Affairs Committee of the 
Cabinet. Butler reported that he was being lobbied by the Jockey Club, who |
were proposing a levy on bookmakers to support horse-racing should off-the- 
course betting be legalised. While recognising that precedents existed in other 
industries and that the government could be embarrassed in the House of Lords 
if a Bill did not apply such a levy, Butler argued that any future Bill should be 
a ‘measure of social reform’ and not ‘for the benefit of private sporting 
interests’.’®"’ The Committee did express sympathy for the views held by the 
Jockey Club, but agreed with the Home Secretary that ‘the prospects of the Bill 
would be prejudiced by the inclusion of provisions on the lines sought by the a
Jockey Club’.’®^ Despite this determination, just weeks later Butler was %
advising the Cabinet to postpone the introduction of the Bill. One of the 
reasons for dropping the Bill was opposition from horse-racing interests, and 
thereby part of the Conservative party, ‘if the Bill did not contain a provision 
requiring bookmakers to make a financial contribution to the cost of 
conducting horse-racing’. ’®®
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Following his conversion to reform, Butler still had to find a solution to the 
levy issue and so brought the matter back to the Home Affairs Committee.
After much discussion the Committee finally agreed that ‘some concession 
might have to be made to the Jockey Club’s views in order to facilitate the 
passage of the Bill’.’®^ This was a complete contrast to the view the 
Committee had taken in April 1957. The Committee concluded that the only 
solution was to establish an enquiry to look into the problem, which would I;
allow the government to introduce the betting Bill without being plagued by 
the issue.’  ^ The compromise worked. A committee of enquiry was 
established, under the chairmanship of Sir Leslie Peppiatt, which was 
welcomed by many Tory MPs during the debates on the Betting and Gaming 
Bill. Peppiatf s Committee, which reported in April 1960, found in favour of 
introducing a levy, which the Cabinet agreed should be implemented as soon as 
Parliamentary time permitted.’®® In the meantime the Betting and Gaming Bill 
was going through its final stages in Parliament. The only remaining 
opposition to the Bill came mainly from Nonconformist Welsh Labour MPs 
who opposed the Bill on principle. At its Third Reading on 11 May 1960, the 
Bill easily passed its final stage in the Commons, with just 42 MPs voting 
against it.^ ®®
The second issue raised in Johnson’s Crossbow article which Butler was to 
tackle was the ‘Byzantine’ licensing laws. The hours which public houses 
could open each day were heavily regulated by laws dating back to the First 
World War and subsequent legislation had opened a number of loop-holes.
A'While pubs had strictly controlled opening hours and could be checked by the 
police at any time, clubs could operate outside permitted hours restrictions and 
required the police to obtain a waiTant before they could enter. All this, argued 
Johnson, restricted consumer choice in Britain and was damaging the growth of
I
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the tourist industry. Johnson’s solution was to abolish the permitted hours 
regulations.^®’
Unlike betting and gaming, on licensing Butler did not have the 
recommendations of a Royal Commission waiting to be implemented. This 
point was highlighted by Cunningham who believed that reforming the
Butler disagreed, and instead decided that the Home Office should prepare a 
Licensing Bill. When bringing the issue of licensing reform before the Home 
Affairs Committee, Butler was keen to stress that he was not recommending 
any radical reform; for example he was not considering abolishing the 
permitted hours regulations and would not be making radical changes to 
opening times on Sundays, as ‘this would bring in Sabbatarian considerations
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licensing laws would prove to be more controversial than those on gambling.
For that reason he believed it would be best to follow past practice and 
establish some form of enquiry on which to base any legislation. That said, 
there could be no guarantee that any enquiry would be able to produce a 
unanimous report that could be acted upon.^®^
4:■ A
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and in particular would raise the special controversy of Welsh Sunday closing’. f
%
Rather Butler believed that there was ‘room for easement where the shoe 
pinches’.^ ®^ Indeed, the proposals that Butler recommended to his colleagues 
reflected this approach, with the section of the Bill dealing with clubs seeking 
to introduce a rigid system of control. A slight liberalisation of an hour a day 
was proposed as far as permitted hours were concerned. Perhaps the most 
radical aspect of Butler’s proposals was the creation o f new licenses for I
restaurants and hotels that were mainly aimed at the tourist industry, but 
contained sufficient safeguards to assuage temperance critics.^®"’
HO 295/1 : Crossbow, ‘Puritans Stopped Play’, Christopher Johnson, January 1959. :i
H 0295/1 , minute from Cunningham to Butler, 19 January 1959. I
CAB 134/1978, HA (59) 66, 30 June 1959, Licensing Legislation -  Memorandum by
the Secretary o f  State for the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal, |
204 CA3  134/1982, HA (60) 86, 27 June 1960, Licensing Legislation -  Memorandum by f
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However, Henry Brooke, the Minister for Welsh Affairs, announced that he 
was, ‘currently examining the case, which appeared to be strong, for repeal of 
the Welsh Sunday closing legislation and would probably propose that this 
should be dealt with in the present Bilf.^^^ This was exactly what Butler had 
tried to avoid. Brooke was now proposing that a moderate liberalising measure 
should be turned into a contentious piece of legislation that would excite the 
temperance movement and would rally Nonconformist opinion in the House of 
Commons in opposition to the Bill.
Over the next few months Butler and Brooke fought to find a solution to the 
Welsh Sunday closing issue. It soon became clear, however, that they could 
not agree on how to proceed and so, in a joint memorandum to the Home 
Affairs Committee, Butler and Brooke argued for completely different 
solutions.^^*  ^ In the memorandum they identified four possible ways of
.'ÿ.proceeding; firstly to include Wales in the Bill and weather the opposition; 
secondly to put the issue to the proposed Joint Select Committee on Sunday 
observance; thirdly to remit the issue to an ad hoc committee of Welshmen; 
and finally to decide the matter by a referendum in Wales. Both agreed that the 
first and third options were unworkable. To include Wales in the Bill 
regardless of the opposition would make it impossible for Welsh Conservative 
MPs to support the Bill -  and their support was felt to be essential. In addition 
the idea of appointing a committee of Welshmen was rejected because they hwould be unlikely to produce a unanimous report and may recommend a 
referendum anyway.
Of the remaining solutions, Butler was in favour of referring the matter to a 
Joint Select Committee, whilst Brooke supported a referendum. Butler argued 
that a referendum was ‘alien to our constitutional practice and a negation of
When the Home Affairs Committee came to discuss the joint memorandum, it 
quickly became clear that there was no support for Brooke’s proposal for a 
referendum due to the impact this could have in S c o t l a n d . I n s t e a d  the
Memorandum by the Secretaiy o f  State for the Home Department and Minister o f  Welsh 
Affairs.
Memorandum by the Secretary o f State for the Home Depaitment and Minister o f  Welsh 
Affairs.
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representative government’ and would set a dangerous precedent; for example, 
it may spark calls by Scottish Nationalists for a referendum on establishing a 
Scottish Parliament. Furthermore, there was no precedent for nationwide 
referenda in Britain, but rather only Tocal option’, which were elections held 
within local authority areas on specific local issues. Finally Butler argued that 
the industrialised South of Wales, who were largely in favour of Sunday 
opening, would out-vote the rural North, where it was believed the majority 
favoured the status quo. In addition, although it was not mentioned in the 
memorandum, it may have been in the back of Butler’s mind that to refer the 
matter to a Joint Select Committee would mean that Butler could proceed with 
the Bill that he had originally intended without being dogged with the 
controversial Sunday closing issue. Brooke, on the other hand, believed that 
the recommendations o f a Joint Select Committee, a majority of whose 
members would be English, would not gain popular support in Wales. 
Moreover, a referendum would meet the concerns of Welsh Tory MPs and no 
one would be able to dispute the result as it would be the ‘unfettered decision 
ofW ales’.^ ’
I
Committee came down in favour of the ‘local option’. Both Butler and Brooke 
had argued against this as they believed that any reform would have to apply 
right across W a l e s . H o w e v e r ,  with neither willing to give way, a 
compromise was required and the ‘local option’ seemed like the only option. 
The Committee did recognise that if  the local option was to be used the Bill
TNA: CAB 134/1983, HA (60) 130, 20 September 1960, Sunday Closing in Wales -  Joint g
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referendum that he had supported.^
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would have to be carefully worded so that the main purpose of the legislation 
was not frustrated ‘in at any rate the greater part of Wales’.
As the only solution to the deadlock the Cabinet agreed to local p o l l s . T h i s  
quickly became a matter of controversy and rallied Welsh MPs in opposition to §
the Bill. Welsh MPs argued that there was no demand from the Welsh public 
for such a change and many suggested that the Bill was inspired by the /
brewers, who, they alleged, were the paymasters of the Conservative party. ft
Furthermore, they attacked the proposal for local polls and instead argued that T
the decision should be made by Welsh MPs.^’^  It was left to Brooke to defend 
the government’s decision to hold local polls rather than the national
With the Conservative’s large Parliamentary majority the fate of the Bill was 
never in doubt. Despite the vocal opposition of the Welsh Labour MPs and the 
Conservative backbencher Sir Cyril Black, the Bill received its Third Reading 
with just 56 Members voting against. All that remained was to call the 
elections which were to be held on a county by county basis, which were held 
on 8 November 1961.^*^ In the elections, eight of the 13 Welsh counties voted 
against Sunday opening; but all four county boroughs voted in favour. It was 
not until the 1970s that Sunday opening was finally to spread throughout 
Wales.^ '^
Johnson’s Crossbow article had inspired Butler to implement the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission on betting and gaming and had led 
to a moderately reforming Licensing Act. However, Butler’s attempts to act on 
the third issue raised by Johnson, reform of Sunday observance legislation,
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received a very cool reception from within the Home Office as well as in 
Downing Street. With very little support in the government, Butler was 
ultimately frustrated in his desire to bring in legislation on this issue.
Butler does seem to have been persuaded that, unlike licensing reform, it would 
be impossible to legislate on Sunday observance without first establishing
TNA: HO 295/1: Crossbow, Johnson, ‘Puritans Stopped Play’.
TNA: HO 295/1, minute from Cunningham to Butler, 19 January 1959.
TNA: Home Office: Entertainments: HO 300/2, Correspondence between Butler and
Under the observance legislation many forms of entertainment were prohibited 
on a Sunday and many restrictions limited trading. For example, theatres had 
to remain closed, open-air entertainments where admission was charged, such 
as football or cricket matches, were prohibited, while cinemas were subject to 
local option. In addition, there were restrictions on trading which led to some 
strange anomalies on what shops could and could not sell; ‘they may sell fruit, 
unless it is bottled; cream, unless it is tinned, though tinned clotted cream is all l |
right; newly cooked provisions, but not fish and chips, and so the catalogue of 7
absurdities continues’. Johnson therefore argued that all the Sunday 
observance laws should be repealed, so that it would be up to each individual 
to decide how to spend the Sabbath.^’^
In his response to the Crossbow articles, Cunningham warned that reform to 
the Sunday observance laws would be extremely controversial.^’^ '•sFurthermore, there was no consensus on what form any amendment to the law 
should take and so Cunningham concluded that ‘If something must be done, 
there may be something to be said for putting off the evil day and setting an 
enquiry on foot’.^’  ^ Other senior officials shared Cunningham’s concerns.
When looking at possible future legislation Sir Austin Strutt believed that ‘It is 
unlikely that the Government would take action in a matter which will certainly 
be controversial of its own motion’.^
Cunningham; minute from Cunningham to Butler, 2 March 1959.
TNA: HO 300/2, Correspondence between Butler and Cunningham; minute from Sir §
Austin Strutt to Cunningham, 2 December 1959.
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some form of enquiry. He rejected the idea of a Royal Commission as it would 
not report quickly enough, clearly indicating that Butler wanted early 
legislation on the issue. Moreover, Butler deemed a Departmental Committee 
unsuitable for the issue and so recommended to the Home Affairs Committee a 
Joint Select Committee of members of both Houses of Parliament. This would
ftthen allow legislation to be introduced in the 1962-3 session. The Committee ft
agreed to Butler’s proposal ‘subject to the concurrence of the Prime 
Mi ni st er ’ |
;•Macmillan, however, had already expressed his concerns about the possibility
:of a Sunday Observance Bill. A month before the Home Affairs Committee
had agreed to Butler’s proposal, the Prime Minister had informed him that he
was ‘a little worried’ about having to tackle such controversial legislation so
near to a general election and argued that if they were to act it should be as
soon as possible.^^' Butler agreed with Macmillan’s concerns, but argued that
‘We are not ready to tackle this problem . . . some form of inquiry will be ft
n e c e s s a r y A f t e r  the Home Affairs Committee had agreed to an enquiry,
, ' /ftMacmillan decided to bring the matter to Cabinet, the same tactic that he had 
unsuccessfully used when trying to block the suicide and betting B i l l s , b u t  
the Cabinet again backed Butler.
Yet it became clear that the issue of timing was of increasing importance. 
Cunningham advised Butler that a Select Committee could not be set up until 
the end of I960 and would then only have a short time to take evidence and 
report if legislation was to be ready by the end of 1962.^^^ In addition, Butler 
received a minute from the Chief Whip, Martin Redmayne, who had been 
sounding out Conservative MPs on the possibility of legislation. Redmayne 
reported that ‘The initial reaction was against any more social legislation this
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.session . . . and indeed it was argued that any Select Committee report received f
before the next Election would be dangerous’.^ ^^  As a result, Butler started to 
move in favour of setting up a Departmental Committee, over which he would 
have more control.
In early 1961 Butler went back to the Cabinet, this time to ask for the authority
' f tto appoint a Departmental Committee. When discussing the Home Secretary’s
proposal with the Prime Minister, the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Norman Brook,
seemed to be almost exasperated by Butler’s persistence. ‘Can we not leave
this alone?’ asked Brook, ‘There is no conceivable possibility of gaining credit
from meddling with it. And there is every risk of political embarrassment -  or
worse’. B r o o k ’s explanation for Butler’s determination to act on Sunday
observance was that:
The Home Secretary wants to have this enquiry in order to round off his
record of “reform” at the Home Office. But I do not believe that there
is any credit to be gained by the Government -  indeed, I think a report
on this subject will prove a grave political embarrassment. The dog is |
somnolent now; but, if roused, it can give a lot of trouble.
Brook is correct in his opinion that Butler saw action on Sunday observance as 
part of his record of reform, but it is questionable whether Butler would have 
pressed for it if he believed it would damage the government. Brook’s 
correspondence with the Prime Minister was taking place as the Suicide, f
Licensing and Criminal Justice Bills were going through Parliament, when 
Butler was fighting off demands from Tory backbenchers for a return of the 
birch, and as the campaign to clear the name of Timothy Evans had reached the 
Commons. Butler was at the heart of all these debates and was as a result a 
controversial figure and now he was proposing more controversial legislation.
However, it seems that by this time Butler had ceased to believe that an 
enquiry would be conducted quickly enough for him to bring in legislation. ft
ft:
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After the Cabinet had agreed that the Departmental Committee should be 
established, Butler wrote to invite the former Tory Cabinet minister Lord 
Crathorne to be its Chairman, Crathorne was reluctant to accept, but Butler 
persuaded him that Tt is not an enquiry which need be carried out with undue 
expedition’ Butler had resigned himself to the fact that any legislation 
would have to take place after the next general election, when the likelihood of
' f thim still being Home Secretary was slim. The Prime Minister and the Chief 
Whip had both given warnings against Sunday observance legislation being
"<Lintroduced late in the Parliament, as had Sir Charles Cunningham and even the 
junior Home Office minister Dennis V o s p e r . I n  addition, Butler’s 
experiences over Sunday opening in Wales may have added to the weakening 
of his resolve on the matter. However, Butler had said in relation to penal 
reform that ‘I have been long enough employed in tasks of this sort to realise 
that what matters is launching the scheme. Its execution may have to depend 
on future circumstances and on other m i n i s t e r s B u t l e r  had secured the 
enquiry, what happened next would be up to others.
The Betting and Licensing Acts have been seen as examples of Butler’s 
inherent liberalism and refusal to give way to right-wing elements of the Tory 
p a r t y . I n i t i a l l y ,  however, Butler was disinclined to take action on these 
issues and it was only in response to Johnson’s Crossbow article that he /I
decided on some measure of reform. Files at the National Archives, which 
provide a unique insight not to be found either amongst Butler’s papers or 
other contemporary sources, show the impact of the Crossbow articles on 
Butler; demonstrating his volte-face on introducing a Betting Bill and 'Ihighlighting the problems caused by the Jockey Club’s clout with Tory MPs 
and Peers. In addition, the Archives also show that Butler’s Licensing Bill was
.ÿnever intended to be the controversial measure that it became. Instead Butler
-iwas proposing moderate reforms and had no intention of getting into the Welsh
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Sunday closing issue. It was Henry Brooke that had insisted on the inclusion 
of Wales in the Bill.
Meanwhile Butler’s failed attempt to reform the Sunday observance laws has, 
until recently, gone unnoticed. Again the inspiration for this came from 
Johnson’s article, but the issue was so controversial that civil servants and 
ministers remained unconvinced of the advisability of tackling the issue. Yet, s
early on Butler had recognised that, unlike licensing reform, an enquiry of
some description was necessary as a prelude to legislation; and by the time he 
invited Lord Crathorne to be chairman, Butler had already concluded that 
implementing the committee’s proposals would be up to a future Home 
Secretary.
s..-;
It is also important to note the reaction of civil servants to Butler’s activities on 
these issues. If Jenkins’ portrayal o f Cunningham as an impediment to reform 
is accurate, it would be expected that Cunningham would have attempted to 
block or delay Butler’s initiatives. However, Cunningham accepted that the 
existing laws on betting, licensing and Sunday observance were in need of 
reform. With the recommendations of the Royal Commission waiting to be 
implemented there was no delay in producing a Betting Bill; although he 
certainly was more cautious than Butler when it came to licensing, where 
Cunningham believed that an enquiry was desirable before taking action. On 
Sunday observance legislation, Cunningham agreed that the law was in need of 
reform but again believed that an enquiry was first necessary. In this he was 
not alone. Sir Austin Strutt believed it would be folly to attempt action on 
Sunday observance and the Cabinet Secretary was reduced to almost begging 
Macmillan to force Butler to drop the issue. Other than Butler, there was no 
one in government who believed it worth the trouble to deliver Sunday 
observance reform.
Finally, the Prime Minister’s lack of sympathy with his Flome Secretary 
becomes even more apparent. On betting and gaming and on Sunday
' f t
;observance the Prime Minister used the same tactic to try and frustrate Butler 
that he had attempted to use on the Suicide Bill. Macmillan’s attitude to 
Sunday observance reform is perhaps not surprising as within government ft
•Ithere was no real appetite to tackle this issue. However, he only reluctantly 
accepted the addition of betting and gaming to the party’s manifesto and then 
attempted to have the Bill dropped from the Queen’s Speech. Macmillan was
ft:unsuccessful in his scheming but it is incredible that not only was he so 
opposed to the legislation emanating from the Home Office, but also that he 
was so ineffective at frustrating it.
There are many similarities between Butler’s record on penal reform and the
■;s;rsocial reforms discussed above. Both were inspired by journal articles and, 
although Butler has been praised for these reforms, both have been largely 7
neglected by those studying Butler’s Home Secretaryship. And just as the
' f tdebates over corporal punishment and the death penalty eclipsed Butler’s penal 
reforms, his social reforms have largely been overshadowed by his response to 
the rise in Commonwealth immigration and to the Wolfenden Committee’s
■|report on prostitution and homosexual offences.
"7:1
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Chapter 5 -  The Wolfenden Report
recommended that the age of consent should be set at 21 years.
It is easy today to underestimate just how controversial these recommendations 
were in the 1950s. Before accepting the invitation to chair the Committee,
Robert Rhodes James, Bob Boothby: A Portrait (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), pp. 
369-71; and Stephen Jeffery-Poulter, Peers, Queers and Commons: The Struggle For Gay
In September 1957 Butler received the Wolfenden Committee’s report on 
homosexual offences and prostitution. The Committee had been established in 
1954 by the then Home Secretary, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, in response to 
growing Parliamentary pressure for some form of enquiiy into the laws relating 
to homosexual offences. Sir John Wolfenden, the Vice Chancellor of Reading 
University, was appointed to chair the Committee which spent the next three 
years producing the report that Butler was to receive in the autumn of 1957.^^^
Butler’s response to the report, to implement the recommendations on 
prostitution but not on homosexuality, has been seen by some as damaging to 
his liberal reputation,^^'’
Underlining the Wolfenden Committee’s recommendations was the principle B
that the main purpose of the law was the preservation of public order and ft
decency but that an individual’s morality, or immorality, was entirely a private 
affair and therefore no business of the law.^^^ Having established this principle 
the Committee concluded that ‘We do not think that it is proper for the law to 
concern itself with what a man does in private’ and as a result that ‘homosexual 
behaviour between consenting adults in private should no longer be a criminal 
offence’. I n  order to protect the young from predatory older men and to 
allow teenage boys to pass tlirough any ‘homosexual phase’ the Committee
Law Reform From 1950 to the Present (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 19-22 & p. 28.
Howard, RAB, p. 265. |
Lord Wolfbnden, Turning Points: The Memoirs o f  Lord Wolfenden (London: The Bodley 
Head, 1976), p. 142.
PP: Report o f  the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, HMSO, 1957 
(247), p. 21 & p. 27. ' I
PP: Report on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, pp. 27-8. >;
I
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Wolfenden thought carefully about the damage that would be done to his
reputation if he accepted and whether it would lead to the bullying of his
children at s c h o o l I n  his memoirs he explained that:
Most ordinary people had never heard of homosexuality; and of those 
that had the great majority regarded it with something nearer disgust 
than to understanding . . .  I am simply pointing out that an effort of 
memory or imagination is necessary to realise the difference between 
then and now.^^^
Indeed, hostility towards homosexuality was growing during the 1950s as a 
result of the increased emphasis on the importance of marriage and the family 
and the association of homosexuality with national decline and even 
espionage.^'’^  Rather than a softening of approach towards homosexual men, 
the 1950s saw a crackdown by the police and a large increase in the number of 
men prosecuted for homosexual offences.^"”
Wolfenden, Turning Points, pp. 132-3.
Wolfenden, Turning Points, p. 132.
Sandbrook, Never H ad It So Good, pp. 563-4.
Derek McGhee, ‘Beyond Toleration: Privacy, Citizenship and Sexual Minorities in England 
and W ales’, The British Journal o f  Sociology 55 (2004) p. 359.
Rhodes James, Boothby, pp. 369-70.
Leo Abse, Private M ember (London: Macdonald, 1973), p. 147.
Sandbrook, Never H ad It So Good, p. 562.
And it was not just the general public that demonstrated a detestation of
fthomosexuality. In response to pressure to take action, Maxwell Fyfe declared ft
that ‘1 am not going down in history as the man who made sodomy l egal ’ I  
Maxwell Fyfe, now Lord Kilmuir, was Lord Chancellor during Butler’s Home 
Secretaryship, and was reportedly unable to remain in the Cabinet Room 
whenever the issue of homosexuality was discussed.^'^^ Another leading 
member of the Cabinet, Lord Hailsham, had described homosexuality as ‘a 
proselytising religion . . . contagious, incurable, self-perpetuating’ and was 
firmly against any relaxation of the law.^'’^  It was in these circumstances, then, 
that Butler received the Wolfenden Committee’s report.
It has become generally accepted that Butler was initially inclined to act on the 
Committee’s recommendations, but reluctantly had to give way due pressure
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from his junior minister, David Renton, in particular and of the Conservative 
party in general. Renton was appointed to the Home Office in January 1958 
and was to stay there for the rest of Butler’s time as Secretary of State.
According to Anthony Howard, Renton ‘was to exercise a decisive influence 
(not always in line with Rab’s own progressive inclinations) over departmental ft
policy, especially on social questions like Commonwealth immigration and
homosexual law reform’. W h e n  appointing him to the position, Butler asked 
Renton whether he would feel able to help caiTy through legislation to 
implement the Wolfenden recommendations. Renton replied that he would be 
prepared to help implement the sections on prostitution, but his conscience 
would not allow him to assist with legislation on homosexuality. With 
Renton’s opposition, in addition to the general feeling of the party against the 
section of the report on homosexuality, Butler caved and dropped any thought 
of implementing the recommendations.
The source of this information was David Renton himself, who was 
interviewed by Howard in 1985. Yet, while it would not be surprising for the 
Home Secretary to discuss with his new junior minister possible future 
legislation, it would be surprising if the junior minister dictated the legislative 
agenda to his new boss. This view of the right-wing junior minister frustrating
recommendations on homosexuality that is not as damaging to his liberal 
credentials.
Howard did express concern about the reliability of some of the oral evidence 
he accumulated when he stated ‘that there is no more flawed resource for 
recalling the events of yesterday than human recollection’, and emphasised that
Howard, RAB, p. 258. 
Howard, RAB, p. 265.
Gilmour and Garnett, The Tories, p. 163; and Pearce, Lost Leaders, p. 101.
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the more liberal inclinations of his senior colleague has become accepted by 
those looking at Butler’s career.^^^ Although this reinforces the view of 
Butler’s inability to stand up to stronger personalities, it does offer some 
explanation for his failure to implement the Wolfenden Committee’s
s85 î
he preferred contemporary documentary evidence where it was a v a i l a b l e , |  
Anthony Seldon has described oral history ‘as a valuable, if problematic, 
source of information’ and added that ‘it is vital to check the information 
remorselessly against other sources’ The problem for contemporary 
political historians, however, is that ‘There is broad agreement that the least 
satisfactory class of interviewees is current or retired politicians, who often
■■encounter pathological difficulties in distinguishing the truth, so set have their 
minds become by long experience of partisan thought’. A s  Howard did not
■ft;have the Home Office files available to him when writing his biography, the
oral evidence he collected could not benefit from the rigorous checks advised -
by Seldon.
officials in October 1957, Butler’s view was;
Howard, RAB, p. xiv,
Anthony Seldon, ‘Interviews’, in Contemporary History: Practice and Method, ed. by 
Anthony Seldon (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 14-5.
Seldon, ‘Interviews’, p. 10.
TNA: H 0291/123, minute dated 23 October 1957,
From the Home Office files it becomes clear that, from the outset, Butler had 
no intention of implementing homosexual law reform. At a meeting with
. . . that the Committee’s major recommendation on homosexual 
offences was too far in advance of public opinion to permit of the 
introduction of gov[ernmen]t legislation . . . The S[ecretary] of S[tate] |
expressed his intention, when the debate took place, to make a speech 
on general lines “sprinkled with references to Athens and Sparta”, and 
when the time came w[oul]d like a draft prepared on these lines. (It 
was suggested that Sparta might not provide the best material for a |
speech intended to knock down the recommendation!)^^’
Having come to this conclusion, Butler then took the matter to the Home =7
Affairs Committee of the Cabinet where he argued that ‘the balance of public
'7and Parliamentary opinion would be against implementing it. Accordingly 1 
am not disposed, at the present time, to accept this recommendation’. Butler 
suggested that the line to be taken in any Parliamentary debate was that the 
government was against implementing the recommendation ‘unless it could be
.
86 I
shown that the change commanded the general approval of public opinion’
The Committee, however, wanted a stronger line making it clear that ‘the 
Government foresaw little prospect of being able to introduce legislation on 
homosexual o f f e n c e s T w o  days later the Cabinet confirmed this decision
of the Wolfenden Committee’s recommendations firmly at the door of public 
opinion.
ft
and authorised the Lord Chancellor, Lord Kilmuir, to announce during the 
Lord’s debate on 4 December 1957 that ‘there was no early prospect’ of 
implementing the recommendations on homosexuality.^^'’ All this took place 
before David Renton was appointed to the Home Office. From the time that 
Butler had received the Wolfenden Committee’s report he had ruled out 
legislating to give effect to the recommendations on homosexuality, on the 
basis that public opinion was not ready for such a change. This was what he 
was to argue publicly for the remainder of his Home Secretaryship.
When the House o f Commons discussed the Wolfenden report Butler repeated 
the government’s view that it could not implement the sections on 
homosexuality, and, after references to Athens and Sparta, stated that in his 
opinion ‘education and time are needed to bring people along’ to accept that 
like adultery ‘and other sins’ homosexuality should be removed from the realm 
of the law. Butler did recognise the enormous amount of suffering that resulted 
from the existing law and the opportunities that were open to the blackmailer, 
but had to conclude that ‘General opinion feels that it would be doing too much 
to condone a practice which so many people abhor . . . Those who practice the 
art of government are often painfully aware that it is only the art of what is 
possible’. T h i s  was a carefully balanced speech in which he placed rejection
TNA: CAB 134/1971, HA (57) 142, November 1957, Report o f the Committee on #
Homosexual Offences and Prostitution -  Memorandum by the Secretary o f  State for the 
Home Department and Lord Privy Seal.
TNA: CAB 134/1968, HA (57) 26* Meeting, Item 7, 29 November 1957.
TNA: CAB 128/31, CC (57) 82‘* Conclusions, Minute 3, 28 November 1957.
HC Debates, vol. 596, cols. 365-72, 26 November 1958.
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1Butler’s moderation contrasted with the majority of the contributions which 
followed, as both Conservative and Labour MPs condemned homosexuality as 
a perversion and branded homosexuals as weak and feeble creatures who posed 
a threat to childrenft^^ In winding up the debate, David Renton stated that the 
government was concerned about the possible spread o f homosexuality if it 
was legalised and argued that young men would not be able to grow out of a 
homosexual phase if they were allowed to indulge in it. He also agreed with 
the point made by the Labour MP Jean Mann of the harmful effect on young 
boys of ‘notorious homosexuals’ living openly together.^^^
criminal,
This issue was not to be raised again until June 1960 when the Labour MP 
Kemreth Robinson tabled a motion in the House of Commons calling for the
HC Debates, vol. 596, cols. 382-501, 26 November 1958.
HC Debates, vol. 596, cols. 501-8, 26 November 1958.
TNA: H 0 2 9 1/123, draft o f  David Renton’s speech, November 1958.
The difference of approach shown by Butler and Renton could not be starker.
On the one hand Butler was arguing that it was public opinion that was
preventing action, while Renton was arguing that it was the fear of spreading
perversion and damaging children. In fact, from the Home Office records it is
clear that Butler saw a draft copy of Renton’s speech and forced his junior
minister to make cuts, including the following paragraph:
Personally I think strong case for differentiating between Sodomy and 
other homosexual offences. No wish to enter into revolting details but f
always understood that penetration per anum quite apart from its 
abnormality was to be condemned because it spreads disease and 
whatever else may be said on homosexuality I feel that public opinion 
is never likely to accept that that particular form of it should cease to be
iButler, in his large handwriting scrawled ‘omit’ next to the offending 
paragraph. Renton was not to be allowed to express his personal opinion 
during the speech, even although his and Butler’s interpretation of the reasons
'.7of the government’s rejection of the Wolfenden proposals seemed to be quite 
different.
government to implement the recommendations relating to homosexuality.
After making it clear that he was in no way advocating the homosexual 
lifestyle, Robinson argued that it was time for the government to take action. |
Rather than being dictated to by public opinion, Robinson argued that on many
' J :occasions it fell to government to lead and guide it, and implementing the 
Wolfenden Committee’s recommendations was one such occasion.^^^ Again 
the majority of MPs opposed any liberalisation of the law, with one 
Conservative MP arguing that ‘the homosexual is a dirty-minded danger to the ft:
virile manhood of this country’
:7
Would the removal of the legal sanction make it more or less difficult 
for the bi-sexual and the young to resist temptation to homosexual 
conduct? Would homosexuals be more ready, or less, to break their 
homosexual associations and to seek medical treatment? Would
However, one contribution which did seem to show a shift of opinion was that 
of the Home Secretary. Butler informed the House that since the last debate he 
had authorised the use of Home Office funds for research projects that sought 
to increase understanding of the causes and nature of homosexuality and also to 
investigate the means and extent of its spread throughout society. In addition, 
the Prison Medical Service was looking at the possibility of influencing 
homosexual behaviour by psychotherapy or medical treatment. Butler argued 
that this research would necessarily take some time before reaching any 
conclusions, although he was not arguing that this was the sole reason for his 
delaying homosexual law reform. IRather, Butler argued, reform should be delayed as there were people ‘to whom 
the criminal law and moral law are co-terminus in the sense that they have no '1other point of reference’. At a time when religious and ethical restraints were 
weak, Butler did not believe that this ‘first line of defence’ should be removed.
Butler asked:
HC Debates, vol. 625, cols. 1453-8, 29 June 1960. "ft
HC Debates, vol. 625, cols. 1474 & 1484, 29 June 1960.
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homosexual conduct spread, or, losing the glamour of its rebellion, 
would it decline?^^’
I
Contemporary opinion firmly believed that there were only very few 
‘constitutional homosexuals’ in whom homosexuality was an inherent 
characteristic. For the rest, it was believed, homosexuality was acquired at 
some point. In his speech Butler was reflecting that contemporary view, which 
had led him to fund research into the causes of homosexuality and how it was 
spread. This would allow future action to tackle what was almost universally 
considered a perversion. David Renton had actually opposed Butler’s decision 
to fund this research believing that it was a waste of public money, but was 
over-ruled.^^^
Moreover, this was also a period where it was felt that religious values were #
being undermined and the result was an increase of social problems such as 
rising juvenile delinquency. If there was a certainty that implementing the 
Wolfenden Committee’s recommendations would make it more likely that 
homosexuals would seek medical treatment and would cause homosexuality to 
lose its air of rebellion, and thereby its attraction, the government would have I
acted to implement the recommendations. Yet as no guarantees existed that 
this would be the result, Butler could not countenance taking the risk when 
moral values were already sliding.
HC Debates, vol. 625, cols. 1490-8, 29 June 1960.
TNA: H 0291/124, minute for Secretaiy o f  State, 4 November 1958.
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There is evidence, though, that shows that, by the end of his time at the Home 
Office, Butler had come to believe that some measure o f reform could be 
possible -  but not those recommended in the Wolfenden report. In March 1962 
Butler met with a delegation from the Homosexual Law Reform Society. After 
informing the delegation that there was no majority in the Commons for reform 
of the law along the lines of the Wolfenden report, Butler instead suggested 
that the Society should lobby for a Private Member’s Bill that would seek to 
repeal the Labouchere Amendment. This amendment to the 1885 Criminal
... '
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Law Amendment Act had, for the first time, extended the law to cover all 
forms of sexual behaviour between men and its repeal would remove a law 
which many thought iniquitous; would also reduce the scope for blackmail; and 
would have the benefit of not arousing ‘the same fundamental objections from 
many people as the Wolfenden Committee’s proposals’
others’.
TNA: H 0291/125, minute o f  meeting between delegation from Homosexual Law Reform 
Society and Secretary o f  State, 15 March 1962.
PP: Report on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, pp. 80.
■
This might seem like an extraordinary suggestion for the Home Secretary to be 
making to an outside pressure group, but if  the Homosexual Law Reform 
Society had taken Butler’s advice the pressure would have moved away from 
him as far as the main Wolfenden recommendation was concerned. In addition 
reform by stages may have been more likely to gain the support of a majority 
of MPs and, indeed, may have been more acceptable to Butler. However, it 
was unlikely that the Society would accept such a proposal when they had a 
government sponsored report advocating the very reforms they were seeking.
While the Wolfenden Committee had recommended liberalising the laws 
relating to homosexuality, in the second part of their report the Committee 
forwarded proposals that were designed to ‘clear the streets’ of prostitutes.
The Committee had again based its approach on the principle that the purpose ft
of the law was to preserve public order and decency but that whatever a person 
did in private should be no concern of the law. Prostitution itself was not fagainst the law and the Committee had no intention of recommending that it 
should become so, believing that no amount of legislation could abolish it.
Instead the Wolfenden Committee saw itself as being ‘concerned not with 
prostitution itself but with the manner in which the activities of prostitutes and 
those associated with them offend against public order and decency, expose the 
ordinary citizen to what is offensive or injurious, or involve the exploitation of
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Howard, RAB, p. 265.
266 pp. pQpQf.( Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, pp. 90-2.
TNA: CAB 134/1971, HA (57) 142, November 1957, Report o f  the Committee on
Homosexual Offences and Prostitution -  Memorandum by the Secretary o f  State for the 
Home Department and Lord Privy Seal.
Anthony Howard has argued that Butler’s failure to take action on the liberal
■ftrecommendations on homosexuality while quickly legislating to take action 
against prostitutes dented his liberal reputation.^^^ Yet, the Street Offences Bill 
that Butler introduced in December 1958 made quick progress through 
Parliament and received no significant opposition. Some Opposition MPs did 
speak and vote against it and some women’s groups made their hostility to the ft
Bill clear, but the Bill was welcomed by Conservative MPs and the general ’■ftpublic. However, the files at the National Archives show that this was a piece 
of legislation from which Butler derived very little satisfaction. Much of this 
dissatisfaction seems to come from Butler’s inability to square the circle of 
trying to remove prostitutes from the streets while at the same time trying to ft
produce a Bill that did not seem to discriminate against women. During the ft
i'irdrafting of the Bill Butler correctly identified the lines along which it would be |
attacked for illiberalism and tried, unsuccessfully, to close these off.
Perhaps the most important of these was that the Wolfenden Committee fti
recommended the introduction of much stricter penalties against women while
■fttaking no action against the male customer. The Committee proposed an 
increase in the fines for women convicted of first and second offences and also 
that, for the first time, imprisonment should be introduced as a punishment for ft
women convicted o f a third or subsequent offence. However, to mitigate the 
proposed increased sentences, the Committee recommended that the Scottish /■'practice of cautioning prostitutes on one or two occasions before they were f
arrested should be extended to the rest of the c o u n t r y . B u t l e r  told the
Cabinet’s Home Affairs Committee that these proposals would be attacked by
Iwomen’s organisations ‘which feel, as I do, that a law which penalises the 
prostitute while letting her customer go is unjust’. Butler believed that a Bill 
that took no action to deal with the customer would be bitterly attacked.^^^ |
This problem was caused by the fact that prostitution itself was legal and
" ’ ' - s
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therefore the male customer was not breaking the law. What was illegal was Jj
the loitering and importuning of prostitutes which caused a public nuisance.
The Home Office could find no solution to this problem and as it was
seemingly impossible to deal with the male customer in the Street Offences
Bill attention started to turn towards including stronger measures against the
male pimps who benefited financially from prostitution. Butler’s other junior
minister, Patricia Hornsby-Smith, discussed the need to tackle this issue with
Sir Charles Cunningham and argued that:
In the present temper o f the Women’s Organisations as shown by their 
resolutions on crime and punishment and their phobia about male 
violence, there would be an avalanche of protest if  nothing is done 
about the souteneurs, accommodating landlords who draw fantastic 
rents from prostitutes, and the male protectors in their prowl cars. I just 
do not think we would get away with new penalties against women
only.""'
The result was a decision to implement the minority recommendation of three 
members of the Wolfenden Committee who had argued that stiffer penalties 
were required to deal with men who were living on the earnings of 
prostitutes.""^
Even so, in the House of Commons the Bill was criticised for its bias against 
women. All Butler could do was highlight the fact that the male customer was 
not breaking the law and the only way to punish him would be to make 
prostitution illegal (a course of action that nobody was advocating) and stress 
the increased prison sentences for pimps. In addition, Butler also rather lamely 
added that incidents of male prostitutes soliciting women were very rare, and 
were, in any event, covered by the 1956 Sexual Offences Act.""’’
26S TNA: H 0291/123, Patricia Hornsby-Smith to Cunningham, 1 August 1958. The emphasis
is Hornsby-Smith’s.
HC Debates, vol. 598, cols. 1270-89, 29 January 1959. 
HC Debates, vol. 598, cols. 1270-89, 29 January 1959.
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The retention of the term and its appearance in the Street Offences Bill opened 
an obvious line of attack for the Opposition. Critics of the Bill argued that, 
apart from the stigma created, such a term would imply antecedent guilt of any
the law stood, in order to secure a conviction for soliciting it had to be
I
In addition, Butler also sought to find a way to reform the procedure under 
which a woman was charged as a ‘common prostitute’. This procedure dated B
7
a
back to 1824 and the retention of this term caused Butler to ask his officials to
try and find an alternative.""’ However, after considerable discussion his
officials conceded defeat and minuted that they were;
. . . Strongly of the view that it would be impossible for the police to 
clear up the streets unless it would be possible to proceed against a 
woman who did not actually speak to a man but who walked about, or ft
stood about, the street for the purposes of prostituting herself.""" iThe courts had come to see this as behaviour indicative of a ‘common
prostitute’ and by defining a woman as such action could be taken against her. 7
Neither the Home Office nor the Parliamentary Council had been able to come 
up with an alternative term that would satisfy the sensibilities of the women’s 
organisations (or the Home Secretary) and at the same time allow the police to 
take action.
II
woman brought before a court charged with soliciting. In the Second Reading
Debate, Butler countered these arguments by stating that of the 12,000 cases 
that had come before the West End Division in London over a two year period, 
all of the women charged had pleaded guilty. Butler argued that this proved 
the use of the term was working and should be retained as no alternative could 
be found."""
The final line of attack against the Bill was over the issue of ‘annoyance’. As
1:
--------------------------------------------
TNA: CAB 134/1971, HA (57) 142, November 1957, Report o f  the Committee on
Homosexual Offences and Prostitution -  Memorandum by the Secretary o f State for the 
Home Department and Lord Privy Seal.
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demonstrated in court that individual citizens had been ‘annoyed’ by the 
activities of a particular prostitute. The Wolfenden Committee had concluded 
that ‘loitering and importuning for the purpose of prostitution are so self- 
evidently public nuisances that the law ought to deal with them’ and therefore 
the need to prove annoyance should be scrapped.""'’ Butler realised that to 
include this provision in his Bill would invite attack and that ‘The question 
which it is necessary to decide is whether the conditions of the streets, 
particularly in London, is such that the Government ought to face the 
criticism’.""" In the end Butler concluded that it was necessary to give the 
police the extra power that would result from including this recommendation in 
the Bill. As expected this was attacked by the Opposition, who argued that 
Butler was removing an important legal protection from women and was 
significantly increasing the powers of the police."""
The Street Offences Bill faced no significant opposition in the House of 
Commons, as Conservative MPs were solidly behind the legislation and 
Labour MPs were given a free vote, with some choosing to support the Bill. 
As a result only 25 MPs voted against its Third Reading.""" Moreover, public
274 PP; Report on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, pp. 95-6.
TNA; CAB 134/1974, HA (58) 94, 22 July 1958, Report o f the Committee on Homosexual 
Offences and Prostitution -  Memorandum by the Secretary o f State for the Home 
Department and Lord Privy Seal,
H C Debates, vol. 596, cols 1294-5, 29 January 1959.
PIC Debates, vol. 604, cols. 553-4, 22 April 1959.
TNA: HO 291/1067, Meeting between Home Secretaiy and representatives o f women’s 
organisations, minutes o f  meeting 28 January 1959.
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opinion generally welcomed the Bill. The most determined opposition came 
from the women’s organisations, a deputation from which Butler had met the 
day before the Bill received its Second Reading. This formidable group of ft
women strongly argued against the Bill, mostly using the objections that had 
been foreshadowed when the Bill was in preparation. In response Butler 
stoutly defended both the necessity and the detail of the Bill.""'
Yet, as has been said, Butler derived scant satisfaction from the Bill. During 
its drafting, Butler complained to Cumiingham that the Wolfenden report
::
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seemed ‘to avoid moral issues. I cannot see that a mere “cleaning of streets” is |
a Reform. There seems no redemptive or idealist feature in the proposed 
action’.""  ^ There are perhaps echoes here of Butler’s approach to juvenile 
crime. Rather than ‘whack the thugs’ Butler instead introduced measures that 
were intended to combine the elements of both punishment and rehabilitation, 
with the aim being to reform the offender. In contrast, the recommendations 
that Butler was implementing were aimed simply to remove prostitutes from 
the streets. The Wolfenden Committee had concluded that driving prostitution 
underground and the extension of the ‘call-girl system’ was less injurious to 
public decency than the existing situation."'” There were provisions that could 
lead to a prostitute being refened to a moral welfare officer, but there was no 
comprehensive plan to rehabilitate prostitutes and turn them away from their 
trade; which would become even more difficult to achieve if prostitution was 
driven underground.
Moreover, the sustained criticism of the women’s groups had an impact on 
Butler. Butler’s great-aunt had been the Victorian penal reform campaigner 
Josephine Butler who, in 1870, had founded the Association for Moral and 
Social Hygiene (of which Butler was forced to resign as Vice President as the i
organisation opposed the Street Offences Bill). Butler was sensitive to ft:allegations that he was betraying his great-aunt’s legacy by introducing a Bill 
that penalised the prostitute but not the male customer. Anthony Greenwood,
Labour’s Home Affairs spokesman during the debates on the Bill, seems to 
have touched a nerve when quoting Josephine Butler during the Third Reading 
debate. Butler responded by arguing that prostitutes in the 1950s were:
. . . making very considerable fortunes per week . , . We are not dealing f
with the poor, pushed out by circumstances of a capitalist society to ■
earn their living by prostitution . . .  We are dealing with girls who 
deliberately go into this trade to make a living -  and to make a far 
greater living than do those who do an honest day’s work without 
prostituting themselves or entering into immoral practices . . . We are 
not dealing with the same problem as occurred in Victorian days. It is
•I
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because I have been able to face that problem that I was able to 
introduce the Bill personally, otherwise I should have hesitated."'’
HC Debates, vol. 604, cols. 551-2, 22 April 1959.
Again there are echoes here of the debate on crime. At a time of full 
employment and with the advent of the Welfare State politicians were ft
struggling to understand why crime was continuing to rise, particularly 
amongst the young. It had always been assumed that poverty was one of the 
key factors in determining the level of crime and yet it was rising at a time of 
relative prosperity. Butler was arguing that in Josephine Butler’s time some 
women were forced by crushing poverty into prostitution, but these 
circumstances no longer existed and because they no longer existed Butler was 
able to bring in this legislation with a clear conscience.
Can, then, Butler’s reaction to the recommendations of the Wolfenden 
Committee be considered a blight on his liberal reputation? To answer this it is
ftfirst of all necessary to dispense with the idea that David Renton had a decisive 
influence over Home Office policy, especially as it related to homosexual law 
reform. The decision not to implement the recommendations on
-ft'homosexuality had been made by Butler, then endorsed by both the Home 
Affairs Committee and the Cabinet, and announced in the House of Lords 
before David Renton had even been appointed to the Home Office. Butler may /
very well have sought Renton’s views on the Wolfenden Committee’s report at
qithe time of his appointment, but it is a huge leap to then use this as the
■’j"explanation for Butler’s refusal to implement the proposals on homosexuality. ft
Furthermore, the debate on homosexuality must be placed in the context of the 
1950s when, as Wolfenden himself admitted, most people regarded the issue 
with disgust. Before accepting the chairmanship of the committee Wolfenden 
had to consider carefully whether his reputation would be damaged; and
newspapers, and even Cabinet ministers, thundered against what was I:?■considered a perversion and danger to society. One biographer of Butler has
ft
ft
A recurring theme throughout Butler’s Home Secretaryship was the perception 
of the weakening of religious and moral values which was felt to be adversely 
affecting society and corrupting young people. Butler believed that there were 
people for whom moral law and the criminal law were co-terminus and he
Pearce, Lost Leaders, p. 101,
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described how he Tived in his own time and among Conservatives’ Yet this
seems to have been forgotten, for it would have been more surprising in the J;
climate of the 1950s for Butler to have come out in favour of Wolfenden’s
recommendations on homosexuality. Even when Anthony Howard was writing
in the 1980s it was rare for Conservative MPs to express any tolerance on this
issue.
V
Indeed, not only did Butler live among Conservatives it seems to have been
■ f t
forgotten that Butler was a Conservative. This may be the result o f the ft
development of the Henkinsian’ image of an effective Home Secretary as 
taking a radical approach to moral issues. As liberal and progressive as his 
views were on many issues and as influential as he was in shaping the post-war 
Conservative party, Butler was a Conservative. In addition, Butler’s natural 
moderation in speech has also been seen to be an indication of his sympathy
7 ':,,towards acting on this part of the report. Butler did argue in the first debate on 
Wolfenden that it was mainly a matter of time before homosexuality was 
legalised; but in the second debate in 1960 it is possible to see more clearly his 
personal views. Butler demonstrated that he held the same views as the great 
majority of liberal opinion: that there were a few ‘constitutional homosexuals’ 
and that the rest, at some point in their lives, had been perverted. The idea of 
the homosexual man proselytising to convert other men was also commonly 
held. Butler therefore believed in the need for research to establish the causes 
of homosexuality and to look for possible treatments. And while this research 
was underway, on a purely practical point, Butler recognised that there was no 
majority on the Conservative benches, or within the party, to carry homosexual 
law reform.
i:
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would therefore take no action that would further reduce the laws which 
underpinned these values. The hunt for an alternative term to replace ‘common 
prostitute’ or to find a way to punish the male customers of prostitutes were 
attempts by Butler to cut off certain lines of attack against the Street Offences 
Bill, but they were not so important that they could delay or prevent Butler 
from proceeding with the legislation. At no time did Butler dissent from the 
need to clear the streets of prostitutes and to this end the Bill was certainly 
successful.
Yet, Butler did not see this as an end in itself. This can be seen in his 
complaint to Cunningham that the Wolfenden report had no ‘redemptive or 
idealist feature’. Butler was progressive in that he believed that the law was inot just for punishing offenders but also had a responsibility to reform and 
rehabilitate; and Wolfenden’s recommendations did not have a comprehensive 
plan for doing this. Finally Butler’s sensitivity relating to his forced 
resignation from the Association o f Moral and Social Hygiene and the attacks 
on his policy from the women’s organisations is perhaps understandable.
However, it is clear that his views and those of the women’s organisations were
completely at odds. While Butler could applaud the efforts of Josephine Butler
for working with women forced by poverty into prostitution in the nineteenth
century, he simply could not understand why in the twentieth century, at a time
of full employment, rising standards of living and the Welfare State, women |
were choosing to prostitute themselves. Again these views were entirely in
line with public opinion, but at odds with those of the organisations that were
carrying on the work of Josephine Butler.
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Chapter 6 -  Commonwealth Immigration
The force of the storm of protest that greeted the publication of the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Bill seemed to catch Butler by surprise. After 
more than eleven years of debate within government the decision had finally 
been taken to introduce legislation that would, for the first time, restrict 
immigration from the Commonwealth and the responsibility of taking the Bill 
through the House of Commons fell to Butler. This was to bring him into 
conflict with many of his natural allies within his party and, in addition, draw 
furious opposition from the Labour party.
Given the years of debate before a decision to introduce controls was taken, it 
is necessary to investigate how and why this decision finally came to be made.
Was Butler, as one historian has claimed, opposed in principle to the 
introduction of immigration c o n t r o l s , a n d ,  if  so, what was it that, in the 
words of Anthony Howard, brought his ‘reluctant acquiescence’? Was he all 
too willing to make concessions during the passage of the Bill as alleged by 
David Renton?^^^ How did Butler’s opposition translate into action within 
government or, alternatively, is this another part of Butler’s Home 
Secretaryship that has been misinterpreted?
#
In 1948 the Labour government had passed the British Nationality Act which J
defined those born in the United Kingdom, Eire, the Colonies, Dominions or 
the independent members of the Commonwealth as British subjects with the 
right of free entry into the UK. The purpose of the Act was to attempt to use 
nationality to bind the old, white. Dominions together, and to confirm the 
decades old pattern of white emigration from the UK to Australia, Canada, ?New Zealand and South Africa. However, an unexpected and unintended s
effect of the British Nationality Act was to allow free access to citizens from
100
From 1948 these citizens started making use of this right.
emigration.^^^
3
Jthe ‘non-white’ colonies or the New Commonwealth countries into the UK.
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The landing in 1948 of 500 immigrants from the West Indies on board the SS  
Empire Windrush is seen as the starting point of what became Imown as 
‘coloured immigration’ into the UK.^^^ In response the Labour government 
established a Cabinet Committee to investigate whether restrictions would be 
necessary. Although agreeing that large-scale black immigration into the 
United Kingdom was undesirable the Committee decided that it was not yet 
time to introduce restrictions, but did feel that this might be necessary in the
?future. However, it was agreed that administrative controls should be used to 
try and dissuade potential immigrants from travelling to the UK and that 
colonial governments should be urged to find ways of preventing
During the Churchill and Eden Administrations the immigration issue was 
regularly discussed by the Cabinet. In November 1955 Eden established a 
Committee of the Cabinet under the chairmanship of Lord Kilmuir to monitor 
the i s s u e . W h e n  the Committee reported back to the Prime Minister in July 
1956 only one member, Lord Salisbury, was in favour of the immediate |
introduction of immigration controls on Commonwealth citizens, whereas the 
rest of his colleagues believed that the restrictions should be brought in only
290when ‘it could not longer be avoided’.
The accession of Macmillan to the premiership and the appointment of Butler 
to the Home Office resulted in no immediate shift in the government’s 
immigration policy. Macmillan wrote to Butler in the summer of 1957 to ask
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for an update on the position on Commonwealth immigration and whether ‘it is 
something we ought to face or not?’^ *^ Butler replied that ‘The presence of 
some 120,000 coloured people in this country has not so far given rise to such 
difficulties as to make legislation i m p e r a t i v e I n  fact the Cabinet 
Committee on Colonial Immigrants that Eden had established continued to 
meet until the general election in October 1959.^^  ^ Although Butler retained 
departmental responsibility for the immigration issue, recommendations to the 
Cabinet on policy were to come from the Committee on Colonial Immigrants 
and not from the Home Secretary.
■
With the resignation of Salisbury in March 1957 the most vocal proponent of |
immigration control was removed from the Cabinet. As a result the Colonial 
Immigrants Committee repeatedly recommended that no action was necessary.
This represented a continuity of approach by the various Cabinets since the 
issue was first raised in 1948. A number of arguments were used by the 
Committee to support their recommendations. Firstly, and perhaps most 
importantly, ‘It would draw a distinction between the British subject from 
overseas and the British subject domiciled in this country; as such it could be 
represented as being a major departure from p r i n c i p l e A s  has been seen, 
ideas of nationality were believed to help bind the Commonwealth together 
and, as a result, the principle of free access for every citizen to the 
‘Motherland’ had to be maintained.^^^
Secondly, it was felt that to take action against the Commonwealth could 
damage constitutional advances that were being made in certain colonies and 
could damage the unity of the Commonwealth.^^^ Relations had been badly
■S'
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strained by the Suez Crisis and at one point it looked likely that India and 
Pakistan would leave the Commonwealth/^^ Given the importance of the 
Commonwealth to securing Britain’s role in world affairs it was necessary to 
avoid anything that might further undermine the institution. Moreover, 
constitutional advances were being made in certain colonies as the pace 
towards independence quickened and the government would do nothing that 
might hamper further progress.
Thirdly, it was felt that there was no need for controls to be introduced as there 
was no demand for them from the electorate and, indeed, it ‘would come as a 
shock for which public opinion was still not prepared’. T h i s  is repeatedly 
used as a key argument against immigration restrictions until September 1958. 
Furthermore, it was felt that before embarking on controversial legislation 
every administrative method available should first be tried. Indeed, there were 
some indications that this could prove a successful policy. After immigration 
from India, Pakistan and Ceylon had started to rise in 1958 the Commonwealth 
Secretary, Lord Home, opened discussions with the three governments and 
urged them to take action, which they did with some (albeit temporary)
:3r299success.
Finally, the Cabinet wanted to avoid introducing legislation that ‘would be 
regarded as discrimination on the grounds of race and colour’. T h i s  was f
extremely difficult given the purpose of any legislation would be designed to 
dramatically reduce immigration from the West Indies, Pakistan and India, but, 
at the same time, avoid restrictions on the white Dominions.^^* When the I
132: Commonwealth Immigrants -  Memorandum by the Secretaiy o f  State for the Home 
Department and Lord Privy Seal, 25 June 1958.
D. R. Thoipe, Alec Douglas-Home (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1996), pp. 178-9.
TNA: Cabinet Committee on Colonial Immigrants: CAB 134/1466, CCI (57), 6 June 1957; 
and CAB 129/88, C (57) 162: Colonial Immigrants: Report o f  the Committee o f Ministers -  
Memorandum by the Lord Chancellor, 12 July 1957.
TNA: CAB 134/1466, CCI (58) 2"‘‘ Meeting, 19 May 1958; and CAB 129/93, C (58) 129, 
Commonwealth Immigrants -  Memorandum by the Lord President o f  the Council, 20 June 
1958.
TNA: CAB 134/1466, CCI (57), 6 June 1957.
TNA: CAB 134/1466, CCI (58) 2'"^  Meeting, 19 May 1958.
J
Rich, Race and Empire, pp. 166-7. 
Hansen, The Politics o f  Citizenship, p. 76.
103 I
Labour government established its committee on Commonwealth immigration
in response to the landing of the Empire Windrush the black population in
Britain was estimated at only 30,000; but the Cabinet was already considering
the possibility of introducing immigration c o n t r o l s . A t  the same time the
Labour government had negotiated emigration schemes with Australia and
South Africa in 1945, New Zealand in 1947, and Canada in 1951, which would
.continue the flow of white emigration from the UK to these countries which 
would, in turn, allow them to restrict immigration from Southern and Eastern 
Europe and the New Commonwealth. If the government was willing to 
collude in schemes designed to keep the white Dominions white, it would 
hardly be likely to welcome large-scale black immigration into Britain.
Yet Macmillan’s Cabinet was sensitive to any charge that their actions were the 
result of ‘colour prejudice’ and consequently could not agree on the form any 
restrictions should take. The system of quotas operated in the United States 
was rejected as it would appear to be transparently racist as the quotas would 
be operated against the New Commonwealth countries and not the white 
Dominions.^^"^ Following the willingness of the governments of India, Pakistan 
and Ceylon to co-operate with administrative controls. Lord Home suggested 
that these countries may be willing to accept legislation that applied only to 
them, although this idea was never taken up by the Cabinet.^^^ Another 
suggestion, made by the Home Office, was that legislation could be brought in 
that would allow the numbers of people entering the UK from individual 
Commonwealth countries to be altered at any time by the use of Orders in 
Council. However, when the government came to make the Orders, the 
discriminatory intention of the legislation would become clear as controls 
would only be applied against New Commonwealth countries.^^^ Finally, the 
Committee considered legislation that would apply not just to the 
Commonwealth but also to ‘aliens’. Immigration from outside the Empire was
TNA: CAB 134/1466, CGI (57), 6 June 1957.
TNA: CAB 134/1466, CCI (58) 2"^ * Meeting, 19 May 1958.
TNA: CAB 134/1466, CCI (58) 2"'* Meeting, 19 May 1958.
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strictly controlled by the Aliens Act which had to be annually renewed by 
Parliament. However this was eventually rejected, with Butler firmly against 
any Bill dealing with both Commonwealth immigrants and aliens.
The debate was fundamentally changed by the outbreak of race riots in Netting 
Hill and Nottingham in late August and early September 1958. Butler may
s à
j::'I
have ceded responsibility for immigration policy to the Cabinet Committee, but 
he was still responsible for the maintenance of law and order. Following the 
riots Butler met with the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police to discuss 
the causes of the disturbances. According to the Commissioner the riots had 
been caused by the local white residents’ belief that black immigrants were 
reducing the amenities of their neighbourhoods; that black residents lived in 
over-crowded conditions unacceptable to white people; and that black 
landlords bought property and then raised rents to extortionate levels in order 
to get rid of white tenants. In addition, ‘much hostility was caused by the 
coloured men (in fact, about two dozen or so) known to be living on the 
immoral earnings of white prostitutes’. T h i s  analysis was shared by the 
Labour MP George Rogers, whose constituency covered Notting Hill, who told 
David Renton ‘that white people in the area felt they had been subjected to 
long provocation by coloured people living disreputable lives in appalling 
c o n d i t i o n s A l t h o u g h  it was the immigrants that ‘were usually the objects 
of suspicion, prejudice and contempt’ and subjected to over-charging in 
housing and discrimination in empl oyment ; ^ i t  was the white community that 
felt resentment at black immigration.
The consequence of the riots was to turn the Cabinet towards immigration ■3controls, rather than, for example, race relations legislation. At the Cabinet
  ■//
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administrative controls 31
This left Butler’s proposed Deportation Bill, which was discussed by the 
Colonial Immigrants Committee on 6 November 1958. The purpose of the Bill 
was to allow for the deportation of Commonwealth citizens in certain
TNA: CAB 128/32, CC (58) 69“’ Conclusions, Minute 3, 8 September 1958.
TNA: PREM 11/2920, Minute o f  meeting between Butler, Lennox-Boyd and Ministers o f  
Federal Government o f  the West Indies, 8 & 9 September 1958.
meeting on 8 September 1958 which discussed the riots Butler proposed three 
courses of action. The first was to meet with representatives of the Federal ^
Government of the West Indies and urge them to take similar administrative 
action that Lord Home had persuaded Pakistan, India and Ceylon to undertake.
Secondly, Butler argued that it would be desirable to re-consider introducing a 
Bill to give the government powers to deport ‘undesirable immigrants from 
other countries’; and, thirdly, to implement the recommendations of the 
Wolfenden Committee in relation to prostitution and bring in increased 
penalties on men convicted of living on the immoral earnings of prostitutes.
The Cabinet agreed to introduce the Street Offences Bill (see chapter five), to 
look at a draft Deportation Bill, and also delegated Butler, Lennox-Boyd
(Colonial Secretary) and Macleod (Minister of Labour) to meet representatives /,
of the West Indian government to try and persuade them to introduce
In proposing this meeting Butler was doing nothing more than seeking to 
extend to the West Indies a policy that had seemingly been effective with India, 
Pakistan and Ceylon. However, this clearly demonstrates that Butler had no 
principled objection to introducing some form of immigration control. 
Certainly this was not yet the controversial step of legislating to introduce 
statutory controls, but it was still an attempt to prevent and obstmct the entry 
into the UK that was the right of these Commonwealth citizens. If Butler was 
willing to accept administrative controls there is no reason to suppose that he 
would oppose statutory controls if he felt the circumstances required it. In the 
end, however, the West Indian government refused to cooperate and rejected 
any form of control.^
■■■I,
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circumstances, subject to the approval of the Home Secretary. Butler argued 
that the Bill was necessary as the Home Office feared further racial 
disturbances and that it would benefit the government to be seen to be taking 
‘some action regarding coloured immigrants before the General Election’. 
However, the Committee was reluctant to accept Butler’s proposal as they were 
concerned that introducing a Deportation Bill might ‘prejudice the introduction 
of more comprehensive legislation later on’/*^ a view shared by the Cabinet 
which rejected Butler’s proposal.^
The race riots in Notting Hill and Nottingham played an important part in 
convineing a majority of the members of the Cabinet’s Colonial Immigrants 
Committee of the need for restrictions.^’  ^ Butler’s Deportation Bill was 
rejected not because it was felt to be unnecessary, but rather in case it delayed 
the introduction of immigration restrictions. Yet, despite the majority of the 
Committee’s members being in favour of controls, they still shied away from 
recommending legislation to the Cabinet. One of the effects of the riots, 
though, was to remove from the Committee’s deliberations the argument that 
public opinion would oppose immigration restrictions. Indeed, in advocating 
the Deportation Bill Butler argued that it would be electorally advantageous to 
be seen to be taking some form action.
Yet, even with this new majority in favour of controls and the new conditions 
created by the riots no action was taken before the 1959 election. After the 
election Macmillan did not re-appoint the Cabinet Committee that had been 
regularly reviewing immigration policy since it had been established by Eden 
in November 1955. With the Committee no longer in existence Butler now 
became responsible for immigration policy. The Home Office continued to 
watch the immigration statistics which had shown a marked decline in 1958 
and 1959. When Eden had established the Colonial Immigrants Committee
TNA: CAB 134/1466, CGI (58) 3rd Meeting, 6 November 1958.
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black immigration had jumped from just 2,000 a year in 1953 to nearly 43,000
316 Peter Dorey, British Politics Since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 96.
in 1955 and continued at that level for the next three years. However, in 1958
there was a reduction to just under 30,000 and then to 21,600 in 1959.^’^
il
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Whatever the cause for this reduction, it removed the urgency from the 
government’s discussions and seemed to justify Macmillan’s decision not to re­
appoint the Cabinet Committee.
This reduction did not last, however, and in July 1960 Butler warned his 
Cabinet colleagues of a dramatic rise in immigration.^’  ^ In November 1960 
Butler again brought the issue to the Cabinet’s attention and this time formally 
proposed that the Cabinet Committee should be reconstituted. Butler was 
primarily concerned with the huge increase of immigration from the West 
Indies which in the first ten months of 1960 was more than double the rate of 
the previous year. There were as yet no serious employment concerns but there 
was no guarantee that this would remain the case if the present rate of 
immigration continued. Furthermore, the serious over-crowding in housing 
continued, especially as the immigrants tended to concentrate in certain areas 
and while the economic conditions in the UK remained good it would continue 31'
to attract yet more immigrants. In addition, Pakistan would be unable to 
continue to maintain the administrative controls that it had introduced, which 
would create another source o f pressure.^
The Cabinet agreed that the situation was ‘disquieting’ and that ‘Although it 
would represent a break with tradition, it might become necessary to introduce 
legislation to control immigration from the Commonwealth’. Furthermore, it 
was felt that ‘It was no longer possible to expect that administrative action in 
their countries of origin could stem this high rate of immigration’. This 
conclusion represented the removal of a second significant obstacle to the 
introduction of controls. In the past, legislation had been decided against until
TNA: CAB 129/102, C (60) 128: Coloured Immigration -  Memorandum by the Secretaiy 
o f State for the Home Department, 19 July 1960.
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administrative methods of control had been tried. However, the West Indian 
Federal government had consistently refused to co-operate in the application of
appoint a committee under the chairmanship of Lord Kilmuir. 319
administrative controls and now Pakistan was indicating that it would be
* . . .  unable to continue with theirs. Consequently the Prime Minister agreed to
By the end o f 1960 Butler clearly believed that legislation on Commonwealth 
immigration to be likely. In a circular to senior ministers Butler wrote that ‘if 
we are to legislate in the Home Office field next Session the issues will not fall 
so much under the heading of reform as of surgery, e.g. the possible need to f
control immigration’.^ ’^’ Yet, when Kilmuir’s Committee held its first meeting 
in February 1961 Ministers were still reluctant to introduce controls. Apart
•;ïifrom the objection on principle, the Committee was concerned about the 
damage that would be done if  they were seen to be discriminating on racial 
grounds, especially as delicate negotiations were currently on going with 
Southern Rhodesia to try and secure safeguards to prevent discrimination 
against the black population. In addition, it was hoped to make further 
progress in the West Indies with a constitutional conference planned as a 
prelude to early independence. Again it was decided that no action should yet 'J|
be taken, although a working party of officials was appointed to look at 
methods of control that would not appear discriminatory in nature.^^’
It was at the second meeting o f the Committee, in May 1961, that it was agreed 
that the principle o f free entry into the United Kingdom of all Commonwealth 
citizens should be abandoned. The Committee recognised that the restrictions 
‘whatever form they took, would be represented as a measure of discrimination 
against coloured people. But the influx and the social problems could no 
longer be ignored’; although it was agreed that the announcement should be
TNA: CAB 128/34 CC (60) 59“' Conclusions, Minute 8, 25 November 1960. S
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delayed until after the referendum was held in Jamaica on whether it would 
remain part of the West Indian Federation. The deeision therefore had been
Opposition to the Bill concentrated on three main points. Firstly, and most 
obviously, that the Bill was intended to introduce a ‘colour bar’. As Patrick 
Gordon Walker, who led on behalf of the Opposition in the Commons debate, 
argued:
TNA: CAB 134/1469, CCM (61) 2"“ Meeting, 17 May 1961; and CCM (61) 3'“ Meeting, 
31 July 1961.
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taken to introduce controls and for a Bill to be included in the Queen’s Speech #
of the following Session.^^^
On 1 November 1961 the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill was published to 
fierce opposition from the Labour party and certain sections of the press. Such 
was the force of the opposition that Harold Macmillan claimed that he had 
never seen the House of Commons ‘in so hysterical a mood since the days of 
Suez’.^ ^^  The Bill categorised immigrants into three main types. On two of 
these categories of immigrant (those that were able to financially support 
themselves and those who were entering under administrative arrangements, 
such as, for example, students) there would be no restriction of numbers. The 
third category related to those entering under new Ministry of Labour 
vouchers. These vouchers were split into those who could demonstrate that T
they had a job to go to; those who could demonstrate that they had skills useful 
to the economy; and finally unskilled workers without a job to go to. It was 
this latter category of immigrant that would face restriction, with the number of 
vouchers available periodically set by the government and issued on a first |
come first served b a s i s . M o r e o v e r ,  the Bill also included the provision to 
deport ‘undesirable’ immigrants along the same lines as Butler had proposed to 
the Cabinet in the wake of the race riots.
:îv
It sounds as if there will be no racial discrimination, but everyone Ç
knows that the overwhelming majority of those trying to get in on the
WoxwQ, Macmillan, 1957-86, \>A23.
HC Debates, vol. 649, cols. 696-7, 16 November 1961.
HC Debates, vol. 649, col. 703, 16 November 1961.
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open quota will be coloured people. The net effect of the Bill is that a ||
negligible number of white people will be kept out and almost all of 
those kept out by the Bill will be coloured people,
As has been seen, the Cabinet Committee had rejected an open quota system or 
the use of Orders in Council as they would appear blatantly racist. By opting y
to control immigration by labour vouchers the scheme did not appear overtly 
discriminatory in intent, but it would be in effect as wealthy, well educated or :
skilled workers, who would mainly be from the white Dominions, would be 
allowed to enter freely, while unskilled black workers from the New 
Commonwealth would have to take their chances under the voucher system.
All Butler could do was refute any allegation of racism by stating that the ‘Bill 
is drafted so that there is no racial discrimination’. Butler argued that it was 
the numbers entering the UK that was causing the problem as Britain was 
already a ‘thickly’ populated country, with over fifty million inliabitants and 
limited space. Massive immigration was therefore a considerable problem. In 
addition, Butler stressed that most, if not all, the other Commonwealth 
countries themselves restricted immigration, with many of them operating laws 
much stricter than that which he was proposing.
3The second area of criticism came over how the Bill would operate against the 
Republic of Ireland. This caused as much concern amongst liberal Tories as it 
did on the Labour benches. Butler had warned the Cabinet as far back as June I1958 that the question of whether to operate the restrictions against the 
Republic of Ireland could lead to considerable t r o u b l e a n d  when outlining i
this part of the Bill in the Commons Butler defensively quoted his Labour |
predecessor Chuter Ede who had argued when passing the British Nationality 
Act that ‘if one can do anything at all it is sure to be either by way of creating 
an anomaly or of recognising one’. Although the Bill applied the restrictions
••
HC Debates, vol. 649, col. 709, 16 November 1961.
HC Debates, vol. 649, cols. 687-9, 16 November 1961.
TNA: CAB 129/93, C (58) 132, Commonwealth Immigrants -  Memorandum by the |
Secretary o f  State for the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal, 25 June 1958.
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against the Republic of Ireland, Butler told the Commons that he ‘thought we 
would not be justified in operating this control unless circumstances compelled
■
us, or compel us to do so’/^^ ÿ
Butler explained that there were many practical difficulties in operating the Bill 
against Eire. During wartime it had been found to be almost impossible to /
secure the border between Northern and Southern Ireland and the only other 
option would be to institute controls within the United Kingdom itself, which #
would require Northern Irish residents to produce a passport when landing in 
mainland Britain, which would be resented by the people of Northern 
Ireland.^^” When asked why the Republic appeared in the Bill at all, Butler 
stated that the provisions on deportations would apply to citizens of the Irish 
Republic and that it may be in future necessary to operate the entry restrictions 
if circumstances were to change.
Gordon Walker argued that not operating the entry controls against the Irish
merely served to highlight the racist intent of the Bill:
In its first form, before the Irish were taken out, the Bill was very 
careful to cover up this racial discrimination, but this only makes it 
worse, because a colour bar clothed in hypocrisy provokes even deeper 
resentment than a straight forward colour bar.^^^
This was a view shared by the Conservative MP Nigel Fisher who believed that 
not operating the Bill against the Republic of Ireland made Butler’s argument A
that the Bill was not aimed at black immigrants look ‘phoney
However, not operating immigration restrictions against Southern Ireland 7
opened a loop-hole in the Bill as Commonwealth immigrants would be able to 
travel to Ireland and then through to Britain, Talks had been held with the Irish
HC Debates, vol. 649, col. 700, 16 November 1961.
HC D ebates, vol. 649, cols, 700-1, 16 November 1961; and TNA: CAB 128/35, CC (61)
63'“ Conclusions, Minute 2, 16 November 1961.
HC Debates, vol. 649, cols. 700-1, 16 November 1961.
HC Debates, vol. 649, col. 708, 16 November 1961.
HC Debates, vol. 649, col. 780, 16 November 1961. T
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TNA: CAB 128/35, CC (61) 63'“ Conclusions, Minute 2, 16 November 1961.
HC Debates, vol. 650, cols. 1186-7, 5 December 1961.
TNA: PREM 11/2920, minute from Butler to Commonwealth Migrants Committee, 19 
October 1961.
222 TNA: PREM 11/2920, minute from Macmillan to Butler, 24 November 1961.
government that indicated that they would be willing to introduce controls
against Commonwealth immigrants as long as the UK did not operate controls %
against them.^^'’ However the opposition view of this is best summed up by the
Labour MP R. T. Paget;
As I understand what the Home Secretary has said about the Irish
problem, it is that the control is not to be applied to the Irish unless
there is an absolute necessity; that the absolute necessity will not arise |
as long as Irish immigrants continue to be white, but if, owing to
Commonwealth people coming through Irish ports, the Irish immigrants
begin to be black, an absolute necessity will arise.^^^ I
Finally, the third aspect of the Bill to be criticised was the provision that
.1required it to be renewed every five years or the legislation would lapse. The 
Aliens Act, which regulated immigration from all countries outside the
.Commonwealth, had to be renewed annually by Parliament. Given the close 
ties and shared citizenship between Commonwealth countries it was felt to be 
intolerable for Parliament to have more influence over the Aliens Act than it 
would have over legislation dealing with the Commonwealth.
Æ:
In fact, as late as October 1961, just a few weeks before the Bill was published, 
there was no provision included to make it renewable at all and instead it was 
intended to be permanent. However, on 16 October Butler informed the |
Commonwealth Migrants Committee that he had asked the Parliamentary 
Council to amend the Bill to insert a provision to make it renewable every five 
years.^^^ When the Opposition began to demand annual renewal Butler was 
willing to give way despite Prime Ministerial misgivings. Macmillan sent a 
note to Butler on 24 November to say that ‘I see suggestions in the Press that 
we are going to yield on the period of the Bill from five to one year. Would 
not this be thought rather weak? No doubt you will let me know your 
feelings’. B u t l e r  rejected the suggestion that giving way would look weak 
arguing that it would gain a good deal of Parliamentary support and that it
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would just be a matter of bringing the Bill into line with the aliens 
legislation/^^ This and the publication of the guidelines that were to be given 
to immigration officers were the only two concessions that Butler made during
the passage of the Bill and disproves any accusations that he was ‘far too 
eager’ to yield to pressure from the Opposition or liberal wing of the Tory
party/^^
abandoning its opposition.
- |
Butler later lamented the furious Labour attack on the Bill and argued that only
- ' i fby both parties reaching a consensus could the policies of control and 
integration make it more difficult for extremists to exploit racial tensions.^'”’ In 
fact, it could be argued that such a consensus already existed. It was a Labour 
government that had first considered the issue of controls, when the black 
population in Britain was just 30,000; the first debates in both the Commons 
and the Lords were sponsored by Labour Members who argued the need for 
controls due to the strain immigration was placing on the resources of a small 
country;^"” and according to one historian of race relations, the majority of :.3i
Labour MPs agreed with Butler’s argument that ‘if  the numbers of new
entrants are excessive, their assimilation into our society presents the gravest 
difficulties’. '^’^  In addition, by the 1964 general election the Labour manifesto |
committed to retain immigration restrictions and the following year the Labour 
government introduced stiffer controls.^'’^  Certainly, the Labour Leader Hugh 
Gaitskell was sincere in his passionate opposition to the Bill, but many in his 
party and the Trade Unions were very much in favour of immigration 
controls;^'’'* which led, following Gaitskell’s death, to the Labour party
TNA: PREM 11/2920, minute from Butler to Macmillan, 24 November 1961.
Howard, RAB, p. 287,
Butler, Memoirs, pp. 206-7. T
Andrew Roberts, Eminent Churchillians (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994), pp. 231- 
3.
Rich, Race and Empire, p. 190.
Butler, Memoirs, p. 207. T
Yiome, Macmillan, 7957-56, p. 423. :?
- .  . _ . _ .  , / '   .... . . .  . . .  . . . . . . .
114
Meanwhile, on the Conservative benches there were certainly those who for I
racial reasons wanted to see restriétions on immigration. Many of these were 
stalwarts of the flogging campaign, such as Norman Pannell and Sir Cyril 
Black. At party conferences during Butler’s Home Secretaryship members had 
overwhelmingly supported motions in favour of control and on occasions 
throughout the 1950s some Tory MPs had raised the issue in the Commons.^'’^
In July 1958 the junior Home Office minister, Pat Hornsby-Smith, met with the 
Parliamentary party’s Commonwealth Committee to discuss the immigration 
issue. Whilst ‘The Committee unanimously agreed that discriminatory 
legislation on a colour basis was quite unacceptable’ some members argued 
that their constituencies were now being affected by immigration ‘and they 
made it plain that if the influx continued and coloured unemployment mounted, 
they would press for legislation’.^ '’^  Yet this remained an issue taken up by 
only a few Conservative MPs and no campaign ever developed that came near 
to equalling, for example, the backbench agitation for the return of judicial 
corporal punishment. This perhaps reflected the concentrated nature of 
immigration to only a few parts of the country, but certainly the majority of 
Conservative MPs were happy to support the legislation when it was 
introduced -  with a few like Black and Pannell disappointed the legislation did 
not go further.
By not having the National Archive files available to him, Anthony Howard 
was unable to get a sense of the scale of the debate within government over 
Commonwealth immigration, or of Butler’s role in that debate. This was an 
issue which governments of both Parties had stmggled with for years as they 
sought to reconcile the desire to restrict ‘coloured’ immigration while at the 
same time trying to make it appear that they were not motivated by racial 
prejudice.
Howard, RAB, p. 264; and Horne, Macmillan, 1957-86, p. 422.
246 TNA: HO 344/27, Miscellaneous complaints and enquiries about unrestricted immigration, #
Miss Hornsby-Smith’s Meeting with the Conservative Commonwealth Committee, minute 
dated 17 July 1958. ;•
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The movement towards control can be seen to have come in three stages. 
Firstly the riots in Notting Hill and Nottingham in the autumn of 1958 ended 
any argument in government that the public would be either shocked or 
opposed to immigration controls; secondly, after immigration began to sharply 
increase again from 1960 administrative controls had shown they were 
ineffective; and finally, by May 1961, the scale of immigration and rapid 
decolonisation since 1959 led to the abandoning of the principle of free entiy 
for all Commonwealth citizens. Through all this at no time did Butler ever 
demonstrate any opposition to the introduction of immigration restrictions as a 
matter of principle.
3:1:
Furthermore, as this was a policy under the control of the Cabinet, David 
Renton’s role in the discussions was minimal. Renton did deputise for Butler 
at some of the Commonwealth Immigrant Committee’s meetings, but Butler 
proved capable of determining and advocating his own opinions on 
immigration. Neither was he over-eager to make concessions; making just two 
that helped ease the passage of the Bill. However, perhaps the most important 
point that has been missed in the accounts of this episode is that, 
notwithstanding the passionate opposition of Hugh Gaitskell and a few others, 
this was an issue on which a political consensus was already emerging and was 
to be confirmed in following years. Therefore, by introducing immigration 
controls, Butler and the government were acting in line with political opinion; 
and although not taking a radical approach to the issue, the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act did not mark a dramatic lurch to the right.
116
1
Conclusion
It is clear that it is necessary to revise a number of the commonly held 1
assumptions relating to Rab Butler’s Home Secretaryship. The government
,'s
papers at the National Archives offer an insight into Butler’s approach to penal 
and social reform that was unavailable to his biographer and questions the
.:-Sreliability of the ‘Jenkinsian’ model of Home Secretaryship. From the public 
sources available and the information in the Butler Papers at Cambridge,
Anthony Howard was unable to obtain a fully rounded view of Butler’s time at 
the Home Office.
Certainly Butler believed himself to be a progressive Home Secretary, was 
committed to reform where he believed it was necessary and introduced a 
number of liberalising measures. However, he never saw himself as a radical; 
but rather felt that, like Samuel Floare in the 1930s and Chuter Ede in the 
1940s, he was playing his part in a continual process of reform and that a future 
Home Secretary would take over from where he left off. Moreover, Butler’s 
reforms were defined by the fear of the effects to society caused by a perceived 
decline in moral and religious values and the consequent requirement of a 
‘reformative’ element in the measures he brought forward. Politicians 
struggled to reconcile the rise in standards of living, which resulted from full 
employment and the creation of the Welfaie State, with rising crime and 
permissiveness. This struggle was to have a big impact on Butler’s approach at 
the Home Office.
As a result, Butler placed great emphasis on the need for research to try and 
discover the causes of crime, and of homosexuality and prostitution. Only by 
understanding the origins of these problems could solutions be found and the 
further erosion of moral values halted. In the meantime, the penal system was 
reformed to turn prisons into places of rehabilitation and not just of 
punishment; and corporal punishment rejected as two government reports had 
confirmed it would do nothing to prevent recidivism. In addition, homosexual
t
I
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law reform was delayed as there were those who believed the moral and 
criminal law to be co-terminus, which meant that the existing law, no matter 
how iniquitous, was preventing a spread of homosexuality; and the streets were 
cleared of prostitutes and prostitution sent underground to remove temptation, 
despite the fact this would make it harder to reform the prostitutes.
Butler’s decision to take action on betting and gaming, licensing, and Sunday 
observance reform may appear to contradict his concerns over declining moral 
values. Yet, in his Betting and Gaming Act Butler was merely implementing 
reforms recommended by a Royal Commission which had concluded that
It has variously been argued that Butler was secretly opposed to the death 
penalty from the beginning of his Home Secretaryship, or that he came to 
support abolition as a result of having to decide the fate of those sentenced to 
death. Certainly Butler was in a difficult position, with an abolitionist majority
reform would not be as harmful to society as allowing the existing outdated /
laws to continue in operation; although initially Butler had been disinclined to 
take action due to the problems created by the Jockey Club’s influence over 
Conservative MPs and Peers. Furthermore, although he did not have the |
recommendations of an enquiry to implement as far as licensing reform was 
concerned, all Butler sought was a mild measure to liberalise opening hours, §
bring in new restaurant and hotel licenses, whilst introducing heavy regulations y.
on the operation of independent clubs. The Bill caused controversy only 
because Henry Brooke, the Minister for Welsh Affairs, was determined to 
tackle the Sunday closing issue. Again, on Sunday observance reform Butler 
believed that action was necessary as the existing laws were so full of loop­
holes as to bring them into disrepute. However he quickly concluded that some 
form of enquiry was necessary before any action could be taken, but initially he 
was determined to implement some measure of reform. In this he was 
frustrated, yet it must be assumed that Butler believed liberalisation of Sunday 
observance legislation would be less harmful than continuing with the existing 
observance laws.
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in the Commons, a retentionist Lords, and the majority of Tory activists in 
favour of restoration for all murders. However, although he had little room for 
manoeuvre, Butler consistently argued in favour of the status quo, Butler 
believed that, despite the anomalies created by the Homicide Act, capital 
punishment retained a deterrent value, which at a time of declining moral 
standards, it would be wrong to dispose of; hence his rejection of the 
amendment to increase the minimum age that the death sentence could be : j
suffered from 18 to 21, Like many of his predecessors, it is most likely that
‘iButler came to support abolition only after he left the Home Office.
On Commonwealth immigration, there is no evidence that Butler opposed 
restrictions on principle. The common view of the multi-cultural 
Commonwealth did not include the vision of a multi-cultural Britain.
■3 -
However, the high-minded principles held by many politicians, who saw 
Britain as the Motherland to a quarter of the world’s population, and the 
practical difficulties caused by ushering the remaining colonies towards 
independence acted as a restraint to the introduction of immigration controls.
The race riots in 1958, the failure of administration controls, and the large 
increase in the scale of immigration in 1960 caused the government to 
eventually accept controls, but only after the black population in Britain had 
risen from 30,000 in 1950 to over 500,000 in 1960. Butler did not oppose the 
introduction of these controls, nor was he pressurised into accepting them.
Neither was he desperate to make concessions on the Bill, as Renton had 
claimed. Rather, Butler was part of the growing cross-party consensus that was I■:3to develop more fully later in the 1960s, especially following the sudden death 
of Gaitskell, which accepted the need for immigration control to ensure the full 
integration of the immigrants.
Since Howard’s biography it has become commonly accepted that David 
Renton had considerable influence over policy on the Wolfenden Report and 
Commonwealth immigration. Yet it is clear from the National Archives that 
this is not the case. This does not mean that oral evidence has no place in
.-i
T
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contemporary political history, but does warn of the dangers o f relying on oral 
testimony without being able to crosscheck the information with documentary 
sources. However, acceptance o f Renton’s claims has had a considerable 
impact in the interpretation of Butler’s Home Secretaryship. Butler had 
decided not to implement the Wolfenden report’s recommendations, the 
Cabinet had agreed, and the Lord Chancellor had announced this in the House 
of Lords before Renton had even been appointed to the Home Office. |
Moreover, due to its sensitivity immigration policy was placed in the hands of I
a Cabinet Committee, which meant that Renton was only a peripheral figure in 
these debates and was unable to wield the influence that he claimed. This has f
significant consequences as far as Butler is concerned, for he can no longer be
;portrayed as a frustrated liberal, but rather a more nuanced view is required that 
places him in the context of his time; taking into account his concern about 
sliding moral values and recognising the prevailing political and public 
attitudes.
Moreover, Harold Macmillan, like Renton, is also alleged to have been able to 
easily manipulate Butler. The lack of sympathy that Macmillan had for what 
Butler was trying to achieve is apparent and is perhaps best demonstrated in his 
extraordinary letter on the Suicide Bill, The Prime Minister’s lack of sympathy 
also extended to trying to prevent Sunday observance legislation and also the 
introduction of the Betting Bill, despite its inclusion in the party’s election 
manifesto. Yet, Macmillan’s attempts to block these initiatives were half­
hearted and, with one exception, ineffectual. Indeed, Butler was rarely 
frustrated by his colleagues in the policies that he sought to pursue. It is true 
that in his first year as Home Secretary Butler achieved little other than a good 
speech. However, by demonstrating more determination Butler got the enquiry T
that he wanted the following year which eventually led to reform to the 
working of the courts. Only over the Sunday observance laws did Butler hit a 
brick wall and have to settle for a committee of enquiry whose report was not 
to be published until after his retirement.
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It is also necessary to revise the view of the Home Office as a reactionary
■¥department. On his appointment as Home Secretary in 1965, Roy Jenkins 
quickly disposed of Sir Charles Cunningham. Yet Cunningham can hardly be 
described as a reactionary or portrayed as a roadblock to reform, but rather was 
instrumental in implementing Butler’s penal and social policies. Cunningham 
was more eautious than Butler on licensing reform, but a Bill was quickly
’’i’iproduced in line with Butler’s instructions. And on Sunday observance reform, ÿ;Cunningham was just one of many voices throughout government questioning 
the desirability of taking action on such a controversial issue. Perhaps only 
with Sir Frank Newsam’s recommendation of delay over the appointment of a 
Royal Commission can a civil servant be accused of trying to obstruct Butler.
However, the evidence that exists on this episode is so vague as to make it I'i
impossible to come to any definite conclusion as to Newsam’s influence, 
negative or otherwise; and, in any event, it was ultimately the Cabinet that 
frustrated this proposal. I
The files at the National Archives offer this new interpretation of Butler’s T
Home Secretaryship. Perhaps the most remarkable thing to emerge from the 
Archives is the effect that two journal articles had on Butler. Christopher '4'Johnson’s Crossbow article was to set Butler’s agenda for social reform. $
Butler reversed his previous opposition to betting and gaming reform, and took 
up Sunday observance and licensing reform in response to Johnson’s article.
C. H. Rolph’s article in the New Statesman set the tone of Butler’s approach to 
penal reform. Coming as it did just weeks after Butler’s appointment it is 
impossible to tell if this led to a radically different approach from that which 
Butler would otherwise have taken. Yet it was not just reform of prisons to 
which Butler set his mind, but also to the law and the courts. Butler was one of 
the key figures in determining the direction of the post-war Conservative party 
and as chairman of the party’s research department for twenty years he did 
much to influence policy. It is extraordinary, then, that two journal articles did 
so much to set his agenda when at the Home Office.
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Can Butler, therefore, be described as ‘a great, reforming Home Secretary’?
Given his dedication to penal reform, opposition to corporal punishment, 
legislation on betting and licensing; and if the Street Offences Act, restriction 
of Commonwealth immigration and failure to implement homosexual law 
reform is blamed on right-wing elements in the Conservative party, it may be 
possible to portray Butler as the radical Home Secretary who fits into the 
‘Jenkinsian’ mould. Yet, to do this is to fundamentally misinterpret Butler’s 
Home Secretaryship, ignore much of the available evidence and take no 
account of the circumstances of the times in which he worked. The 
straight]acket of the ‘Jenkinsian’ model which can be discerned in the writing 
on Butler does nothing to help understand his Home Secretaryship. Butler was 
an effective Home Secretary and demonstrated a sureness o f touch that has
' . 7 -
been lacking in so many holders of that office; but if ‘greatness’ is equated 
with perceived liberalism and ‘reforming’ equated with radicalism, then it is 
clearly not possible to ascribe this epithet to Butler. It would perhaps be more 
accurate to describe Butler as ‘a mildly reforming Home Secretary’. Yet, that 
is all Butler ever claimed for himself, believing instead that he was one of a 
line of Home Secretaries to whom fell the responsibility of continuing the 
process of reform.
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